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Since the late 1970s, the major financial centers have relaxed interest-rate and foreign-
exchange controls and introduced more liberal regulatory regimes. In conjunction, these 
policies have facilitated the gradual expansion of international asset markets and warrant 
a detailed study of these increasingly important financial markets. The three papers that 
comprise my dissertation study international asset markets in order to understand better 
the information contained in the price of crude oil futures contracts; whether the 
exchange-rate regime reduces sovereign and private borrowing costs; and the relationship 
between sovereign borrowing costs and liquidity risk. 
 The first paper “What Do We Learn from Price of Crude Oil Futures?” assesses 
the forecasting ability of crude oil futures contracts traded on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange. Despite their widespread use among policymakers and financial analysts as 
predictors of the future spot price of oil, my paper establishes that the best forecast of the 
future spot price is the no-change forecast. This finding does not imply that there is no 
useful information contained in crude oil futures contracts, however. Using a model of 
the spot and futures market for crude, the paper shows that one can interpret the spread 
between the current spot and futures price as an indicator of the precautionary demand for 
crude oil. The paper documents several independent pieces of evidence that show the data 
are consistent with this interpretation of the spread between the current spot and futures 
price. Although crude oil futures prices are poor predictors of the future spot price of oil, 
they do contain information about the demand for crude oil that stems from increased 
uncertainty about the future supply of crude oil. 
The second paper “Did Adhering to the Gold Standard Reduce the Cost of 
Capital?” uses a unique data set of all of the stocks and sovereign bonds traded on the 




exchange rate regime like the gold standard reduces the borrowing costs. The findings of 
this paper are striking. In contrast to other papers that have investigated this question, this 
paper shows that, conditional on British business-cycle risk, there is no evidence that a 
portfolio of assets issued by countries off gold earned higher excess returns than a 
portfolio of assets issued by countries on gold. Overall, the returns to both stocks and 
bonds issued by countries on and off gold are statistically identical. These results are very 
robust to alternative empirical specifications. More broadly, this paper finds that the 
exchange rate regime mattered less for borrowing costs than previously thought. 
 The third paper “How Important is Liquidity Risk for Sovereign Bond Risk 
Premia?” uses the same data set that I use in the gold standard paper to study the 
influence of liquidity risk on the sovereign bond risk premia. Limitations on the 
availability of observable bid and ask prices for internationally traded sovereign debt 
from the contemporary period warrant studying this earlier period to understand the 
influence of liquidity risk on the price of sovereign debt. The paper shows that liquidity is 
an economically important and statistically significant risk that affects sovereign 
borrowing costs. On average, illiquid sovereign bonds yield higher returns per year than 
liquid sovereign bonds and the contribution of liquidity risk to the sovereign bond risk 
premium is economically large. This evidence suggests an independent role for 
unexpected changes in liquidity as a pervasive risk in determining sovereign bond risk 
premia, in addition to either business-cycle risk or interest-rate risk. 
 These three papers teach us about what oil futures prices can and cannot tell us; 
the inability of the exchange-rate regime to affect borrowing costs; and the key role that 
liquidity risk plays as a determinant of sovereign borrowing costs. By answering these 
questions, this dissertation has widened the scope of our understanding and deepened our 
knowledge of salient features of the international financial landscape.
 






What Do We Learn from the Price of Crude Oil Futures? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The surge in the price of crude oil since 2002 has renewed interest in the question of what 
determines the spot and futures price of crude oil and has highlighted the importance of 
being able to predict as accurately as possible the evolution of the spot price of oil (see, 
for example, Greenspan 2004a,b, 2005; Bernanke 2004, 2006; Gramlich 2004; Davies 
2007; Kohn 2007). In this paper, I use insights provided by a theoretical model of the 
spot and futures market for crude oil in conjunction with empirical analysis to shed light 
on the relationship between the spot price of crude oil, expectations of future oil prices, 
the price of crude oil futures, and the oil futures spread (defined as the percent deviation 
of the oil futures price from the spot price of oil). 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I document the use of oil futures 
prices as predictors of spot prices at central banks and international organizations. 
Futures-based forecasts of the price of crude oil inform monetary policy decisions and 
affect financial markets‟ perceptions of the risks to price stability and sustainable growth. 
It is widely believed that oil futures prices can be viewed as effective long-term supply 
prices (see, for example, Greenspan 2004a) or as the expected price of oil (see, for 
example, Bernanke 2004). I put this common practice to the test. Using a newly 
constructed data set of oil futures prices and oil spot prices that includes data up to 
February 2007, I assess empirically whether forecasts based on the price of oil futures are 
more accurate than forecasts from alternative models excluding futures prices. I show 
that forecasts based on oil futures prices and forecasts based on the oil futures spread tend 
to be less accurate than forecasts from alternative easy-to-use models such as the no-
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change forecast under standard loss functions including the mean-squared prediction 
error (MSPE). They also are more biased than the no-change forecast. 
The result that futures prices are neither unbiased predictors nor the best possible 
predictors in the MSPE sense is new and surprising because it contradicts widely held 
views among policymakers and financial analysts. It also differs from some earlier 
empirical results in the academic literature based on shorter samples. Moreover, it 
contrasts with related results in the foreign exchange literature. Although the no-change 
forecast has been shown to work well in other contexts such as exchange rate forecasting, 
there are important differences between the foreign exchange market and the crude oil 
market. Forecast efficiency regressions for oil markets generate the expected signs and 
magnitudes for all coefficients, whereas similar regressions for foreign exchange markets 
generate coefficients of the wrong sign and magnitude (see, for example, Froot and 
Thaler 1990). Thus, the superiority of the random walk predictor of oil prices compared 
with futures prices is by no means expected. 
In section 3, I conduct a systematic evaluation of the out-of-sample predictive 
accuracy of a broader set of oil price forecasting approaches based on the forecast 
evaluation period 1991.1-2007.2.  A robust finding across all horizons from 1 month to 
12 months is that the no-change forecast tends to be more accurate than forecasts based 
on other econometric models and much more accurate than professional survey forecasts 
of the price of crude oil. This makes the no-change forecast a natural benchmark.  
In section 4, I show that the cause of the large mean-squared prediction error 
(MSPE) of futures-based forecasts relative to the no change forecast is not so much that 
these forecasts are so different on average, but rather the variability of the futures price 
about the spot price, as captured by the spread of oil futures. I document that there are 
large and persistent fluctuations in the oil futures spread that are unlike the fluctuations 
observed in the spread of foreign exchange futures (see, for example, Taylor 1989).  
In section 5, I show that these differences can be linked to the existence of a 
marginal convenience yield for crude oil that is absent in foreign exchange markets. Oil 
inventories, unlike inventories of many financial assets, may serve to avoid interruptions 
of the production process or to meet unexpected shifts in demand. This option value is 
reflected in a convenience yield (see, for example, Brennan 1991; Pindyck 1994, 2001). I 
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study the implications of the marginal convenience yield for the oil futures spread in the 
context of a multi-period, two-country general equilibrium model of the spot and futures 
markets for crude oil. I show that shifts in the uncertainty about futures oil supply 
shortfalls may explain the excess variability of oil futures prices relative to the spot price 
that is responsible for their poor predictive accuracy. 
In the model, an oil-producing country exports oil to an oil-consuming country 
that uses oil in producing a final good to be traded for oil or consumed domestically. Oil 
importers may insure against uncertainty about stochastic oil endowments by holding 
above-ground oil inventories or buying oil futures. Oil producers may sell oil futures to 
protect against endowment uncertainty. The model abstracts from oil below the ground. 
The spot and futures prices of oil are determined endogenously and simultaneously. 
Using comparative statics, I establish that under plausible conditions increased 
uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls causes the oil futures spread to fall. Such 
uncertainty shifts also raise the current real spot price of oil, as precautionary demand for 
oil inventories increases in response to increased uncertainty. Increased uncertainty about 
future oil supply shortfalls in the model will cause the real price of oil to overshoot 
initially with no response of oil inventories on impact, followed by a gradual decline of 
the real price of oil, as inventories are gradually accumulated gradually over time. The 
model implies that the oil futures spread declines, as the component of the real spot price 
of oil driven by precautionary demand for crude oil increases. Hence, the negative of the 
oil futures spread may be viewed as an indicator of fluctuations in the spot price of crude 
oil driven by shifts in precautionary demand for oil. 
In section 6, I evaluate these predictions of my model empirically. First, I show 
that the proposed indicator moves as expected during events such as the Persian Gulf War 
that a priori should be associated with large shifts in precautionary demand for crude oil. 
I also find evidence of shifts in the spread associated with the Asian financial crisis, with 
9/11 and with the 2003 Iraq War, for example. My findings corroborate earlier results in 
the literature based on regression dummies as well as historical decompositions derived 
from structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models. Second, my indicator is highly 
correlated with an independent estimate of the precautionary demand component of the 
spot price of crude oil proposed in Kilian (2007a,b). That alternative estimate is based on 
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a structural VAR model of the global crude oil market and does not rely on data from the 
oil futures market. I show that the VAR-based measure and the futures-based measure 
have a correlation as high as 79 percent during 1989.1-2003.12. Third, I show that the 
overshooting pattern of the response of the real price of oil to a precautionary demand 
shock in the Kilian (2007a) VAR model is consistent with the predictions of my 
theoretical model. The concluding remarks are in section 7. 
2.2. Do Oil Futures Prices Help Predict the Spot Price of Oil? 
It is commonplace in policy institutions, including many central banks and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), to use the price of NYMEX oil futures as a proxy for 
the market‟s expectation of the spot price of crude oil.
1
 A widespread view is that prices 
of NYMEX futures contracts are not only good proxies for the expected spot price of oil, 
but also better predictors of oil prices than econometric forecasts. Forecasts of the spot 
price of oil are used as inputs in the macroeconomic forecasting exercises that these 
institutions produce. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) employs oil futures 
prices in constructing the inflation and output-gap forecasts that guide monetary policy 
(see Svensson 2005). Likewise the IMF relies on futures prices as a predictor of future 
spot prices (see, for example, International Monetary Fund 2005, p. 67; 2007, p. 42). 
Futures-based forecasts of the price of oil also play a role in policy discussions at the 
Federal Reserve Board (see, for example, Greenspan 2004a,b; Bernanke 2004; Gramlich 
2004). This is not to say that forecasters do not recognize the potential limitations of 
futures-based forecasts of the price of oil. Nevertheless, the perception is that oil futures 
prices, imperfect as they may be, are the best available forecasts of the spot price of oil.  
                                                 
1
 Futures contracts are financial instruments that allow traders to lock in today a price at which to buy or 
sell a fixed quantity of the commodity in a predetermined date in the future. Futures contracts can be 
retraded between inception and maturity on a futures exchange such as the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX). The NYMEX offers institutional features that allow traders to transact anonymously. These 
features reduce individual default risk and ensure homogeneity of the traded commodity, making the 
futures market a low-cost and liquid mechanism for hedging against and for speculating on oil price risks. 
The NYMEX light sweet crude contract is the most liquid and largest volume market for crude oil trading 
(NYMEX 2007a). 
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There are subtle differences in how oil futures prices are interpreted by 
policymakers. In its strongest form, the price of oil futures is viewed as the best predictor 
of the spot price of oil. This interpretation is exemplified by Greenspan‟s (2004a) remark 
that “… oil futures prices … can be viewed as effective long-term supply prices.” A 
weaker interpretation is that oil futures prices represent the expected spot price of oil. 
That view is illustrated by Bernanke‟s (2004) statement that “… futures prices of $20 a 
barrel suggest that traders expect oil prices to remain at that level”. Before studying the 
theoretical support for these statements, in this section I examine their empirical support. 
I formally evaluate the predictive power of oil futures prices for the spot price of oil since 
the creation of oil futures markets in the 1980s. 
2.2.1. Forecasting Models 
The Benchmark Model 
Let 
)(h
tF  denote the current nominal price of the futures contract that matures in h 
periods, tS  the current spot price of oil, and ][ htt SE   the expected future spot price at 
date t+h conditional on information available at t.  A natural benchmark for forecasts 
based on the price of oil futures is provided by the random walk model without drift. This 
model implies that changes in the spot price are unpredictable, so the best forecast of the 
future spot price of crude oil is simply the current spot price: 
 
(1)  ttht SS  |
ˆ   1,3,6,9,12h   
Below I consider two types of forecasting models based on the price of oil futures. The 
first model simply treats the current level of futures prices as the predictor; the second 
model is based on the futures spread. 
Futures Prices as Future Spot Prices  
The Greenspan (2004a) quote of the introduction implies the forecasting model: 
 
(2)  ( )
|
ˆ h
t ht tS F    1,3,6,9,12h . 
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Forecasts Based on the Futures Spread 
An alternative approach to forecasting the spot price of oil is to use the spread between 
the spot price and the futures price as an indicator of whether the price of oil is likely to 
go up or down (see, for example, Gramlich 2004). If the futures price equals the expected 
spot price, as stated by Bernanke (2004), the spread should be an indicator of the 
expected change in spot prices, although not necessarily an accurate predictor of the 
change in spot prices in the MSPE sense. The rationale for this approach is clear from 
dividing ( ) [ ]ht t t hF E S  by ,tS  which results in 
( )[ ] .ht t h t t tE S S F S   I explore the 
forecasting accuracy of the spread based on several alternative forecasting models. The 
baseline model is: 
(3)   
( )
|
ˆ 1 /ln ( )htt tt h tS S F S  ,   1,3,6,9,12h  
To allow for the possibility that the spread may be a biased predictor, it is common to 
relax the assumption of a zero intercept: 
(4)   ( )|ˆ 1 /ˆ ln( )
h
tt tt h tS S F S   ,  1,3,6,9,12h  
Alternatively, one can relax the proportionality restriction: 
(5)   ( )|ˆ 1 /ˆ ln( )htt tt htS S F S  ,  1,3,6,9,12h  
Finally, I can relax both the unbiasedness and proportionality restrictions: 
(6)   ( )|ˆ 1 /ˆˆ ln( )htt tt htS S F S    ,  1,3,6,9,12h . 
2.2.2. Data Description and Timing Conventions 
Data Construction 
In section 2.4, I will compare the real-time forecast accuracy of models (1)-(6). My 
empirical analysis is based on daily prices of crude oil futures traded on the NYMEX 
from the commercial provider Price-Data.com. The time series begins in March 30, 
1983, when crude oil futures were first traded on the NYMEX, and extends through 
February 28, 2007. Crude oil futures can have maturities as long as 7 years. Contracts are 
for delivery at Cushing, OK. Trading ends four days prior to the 25
th
 calendar day 
preceding the delivery month. If the 25
th
 is not a business day, trading ends on the fourth 
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business day prior to the last business day before the 25
th
 calendar day (NYMEX 2007b). 
A common problem in constructing monthly futures prices of a given maturity is that an 
h-month contract may not trade on a given day. I identify the h-month futures contract 
trading closest to the last trading day of the month and use the price associated with that 
contract as the end-of-month value. For all horizons, I obtain a continuous monthly time 
series based on a backward-looking window of at most five days. For maturities up to 
three months, the backward-looking window is at most three days. My approach is 
motivated by the objective of computing in a consistent manner end-of-month time series 
of futures prices for different maturities. This allows us to match up end-of-month spot 
prices and futures prices as closely as possible.
2
 The daily spot price data are obtained 
from Datastream and refer to the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil available for 
delivery at Cushing, OK. Figure 1 plots the monthly prices of oil futures contracts for 
maturities of 1 through 12 months and the spot price of crude oil starting in 1983.1. Note 
that contracts of longer maturities only gradually became available over the course of the 
sample period. 
The Choice of Maturities in the Empirical Analysis 
The perception that futures prices contain information about future spot prices implicitly 
relies on the assumption that futures contracts are actively traded at the relevant horizons. 
In this subsection I investigate how liquid futures markets are at each maturity h. This 
question is important because one would not expect 
)(h
tF  to have predictive content for 
future spot prices, unless the market is sufficiently liquid at the relevant horizon. 
Policymakers and the public widely believe that the oil futures market provides 
effective insurance against risks associated with crude oil production shortfalls and 
conveys the market‟s assessment of the evolution of future supply and demand conditions 
in the crude oil market. If the market were effectively pricing the possibility of, say, a 
shutdown of the Iranian oil fields or the demise of the Saudi monarchy within the next 
five years, one would expect active trading at such long horizons. The evidence below, 
                                                 
2
 My approach differs from that in Chernenko, Schwarz, and Wright 2004). Their approach is to treat 
futures prices from a window in the middle of the month as a proxy for the futures price in a given month. 
Yet another approach is to substitute the price of a j-month contract for a given day for the missing price of 
the h-month contract on that day where hj  , (see Bailey and Chan 1993).  
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however, suggests otherwise. Figure 2 shows the monthly trading volume corresponding 
to a futures contract with a fixed horizon that is closest to the last trading day of the 
month. Volume refers to the number of contracts traded in a given month.
3
 As illustrated 
in Figure 2, over the past 25 years, trading volume in the futures market has grown 
significantly, particularly at the 1-month and 3-month horizon, and to a lesser extent at 
the 6-month horizon. In 1989, the NYMEX introduced for the first time contracts 
exceeding twelve months and in 1999, a 7-year contract was first introduced. Although 
such contracts are available, the market remains illiquid at horizons beyond one year even 
in recent years. Trading volumes fall sharply at longer maturities.  
This observation is important for my forecast evaluation because one would not 
expect forecasts based on futures with long maturities to provide accurate predictions, 
when only a handful of contracts are trading. Given the evidence in Figure 2, I therefore 
will restrict myself to futures contracts of up to one year in the empirical analysis below. 
In addition, the evidence in Figure 2 suggests that the public and policymakers have 
overestimated the ability of oil futures markets to provide insurance against long-term 
risks such as political instability in the Middle East or the development of oil resources in 
the Caspian Sea. Policymakers routinely rely on futures prices for long maturities in 
predicting future oil prices. For example, Greenspan (2004a) explicitly referred to the 6-
year oil futures contract in assessing effective long-term supply prices. For similar 
statements also see Greenspan (2004b), Gramlich (2004) and Bernanke (2004). As my 
volume data in Figure 2 show, there is very little information contained in futures prices 
beyond one year, making it inadvisable to rely on such data. This conclusion is also 
consistent with prior studies of the crude oil futures market between 1983 and 1994 (see 




                                                 
3
 In contrast to open interest, volume measures the total number of contracts, including those in a position 
that a trader closes or that reach delivery, and thus gives a good sense of the overall activity in the futures 
market. My method of data construction is consistent with the conventions used in constructing the 
monthly futures prices. 
4
 According to sources within the oil industry who wish to remain anonymous, oil companies are fully 
aware of how thin the market is at longer horizons and do not rely on futures price data for such maturities. 
The perception is that one trader signing a couple of contracts with a medium-term horizon may easily 
move the futures price by several dollars on a given day. 
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2.2.3. Real-Time Forecast Accuracy of Futures-Based Forecasting Models 
Tables 1 through 5 assess the predictive accuracy of various forecasting models against 
the benchmark of a random walk without drift for horizons of 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. 
The forecast evaluation period is 1991.1-2007.2. The assessment of which forecasting 
model is best may depend on the loss function of the forecaster (see Elliott and 
Timmermann 2007). I present results for the MSPE and the mean absolute prediction 
error (MAPE). I also report the bias of the forecasts, and I report the number of times that 
a forecast correctly predicts the sign of the change of the spot price based on the success 
ratio statistic of Pesaran and Timmermann (1992). In addition to ranking forecasting 
models by each loss function, I formally test the null that a given candidate forecasting 
model is as accurate as the random walk without drift. Suitably constructed p-values are 
shown in parentheses. 
Oil Futures as Predictors of Oil Spot Prices 
The first two rows of Tables 1 through 5 document that the no-change forecast has lower 
MSPE than the futures forecast at the 1-month, 6-month, 9-month and 12-month horizon. 
Only at the 3-month horizon is the futures forecast more accurate, but the improvement in 
accuracy is not statistically significant. Moreover, based on the MAPE metric, the 
random walk forecast is more accurate at all horizons. In all cases, the random walk 
forecast is less biased than the futures forecast. Nor do futures forecasts have important 
advantages when it comes to predicting the sign of the change in oil prices. Only at the 9-
month and 12-month horizons is the success ratio significant at the 10 percent level and 5 
percent level, respectively, but the improvement is only 2.6 and 3.6 percentage points. 
The observation that futures prices are worse predictors of the price of oil than simple no-
change forecasts is important because it contradicts commonly held views that current 
futures prices are a good guide to the evolution of future spot prices, as exemplified by 
the Greenspan (2004a) and Bernanke (2004) quotations.  
Oil Future Spreads as Predictors of Future Spot Prices 
Rows 3-6 in Tables 1-5 document that the no-change forecast has lower MSPE than 
spread-based forecasts at horizons of 6, 9 and 12 months. At horizons 1 and 3 in some 
cases the spread models has lower MSPE, but the improvement is never statistically 
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significant and no one spread model performs well systematically. Based on the MAPE 
rankings, the no-change forecast is superior at all horizons. These results are broadly 
consistent with the earlier evidence for the futures forecasts. Finally, rows 3-6 reveal 
some evidence that spread models may help predict the direction of change at horizons of 
9 and 12 months. The gains in accuracy are statistically significant, but quite moderate. 
There is no such evidence at shorter horizons.
5
 
2.5.3. Relationship with Forecast Efficiency Regressions 
It is useful to compare my results for the spread model in Tables 1 through 5 to the 
closely related literature on forecast efficiency regressions (see, for example, Chernenko 
et al. 2004; Chinn, LeBlanc, and Coibion 2005).  Consider the full-sample regression 
model: 
 ( ) , 1,3,6,9,12,ht h t t t hs f s u h         
where lower-case letters denote variables in logs and 
t hu  denotes the error term. Forecast 
efficiency in the context of the oil futures spread means that the hypothesis 
0 : 0, 1H     holds. A rejection of these restrictions is interpreted as evidence of the 
existence of a time-varying risk premium (see, for example, Fama and French 1987, 
1988; Chernenko et al. 2004).
6
 Chernenko et al. report that the hypothesis of forecast 
efficiency cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. It is important to bear in 
mind that such evidence does not necessarily mean that oil prices are forecastable based 
on the spread in practice. First, non-rejection of a null hypothesis does not imply that the 
null model is true. In fact, I showed that the forecasting model (3) that imposes this null 
does not dominate the no-change forecasts in out-of-sample forecasts. Second, as my 
forecasting results show, relaxing one or more of the restrictions implied by forecast 
efficiency may either improve or worsen the forecast accuracy of the spread model, 
depending on the bias-variance trade-off. In particular, such models require the 
                                                 
5
 Motivated by term-structure models, I also experimented with models including a weighted average of 
spreads at different horizons. These models consistently performed so poorly that no results will be 
reported. 
6
 Such tests implicitly postulate that the trader‟s loss function coincides with the econometrician‟s quadratic 
loss function. If that is not the case, forecast efficiency tests tend to be biased in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis (see Elliott, Komunjer, and Timmermann 2005). 
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estimation of additional parameters compared with the no-change forecast, and the 
resulting loss in forecast precision may outweigh the benefits from reduced forecast bias. 
Thus, there is no contradiction between my results and the forecast efficiency results in 
the literature. 
In addition, it can be shown that the results in Chernenko et al. are not robust to 
updating the sample. Despite differences in the timing conventions used in constructing 
the monthly futures price data, I am able to replicate their results qualitatively using my 
data, but their sample period. For the full sample, however, I do reject the hypothesis of 
forecast efficiency at horizons 6 and 12 (see Table 6). This pattern is consistent with the 
earlier forecasting results. This rejection of forecast efficiency occurs despite the fact that
̂  is close to zero and ̂  fairly close to 1, as suggested by theory, and very much unlike 
in the foreign exchange literature (see, for example, Froot and Thaler 1990). 
2.3. What Is the Best Predictor of the Spot Price of Oil? 
The preceding section demonstrated that simple no-change forecasts of the price of oil 
tend to more accurate in the MSPE sense than forecasts based oil futures prices. This 
does not mean that the no-change forecast is necessarily the best predictor of the spot 
price. The first part of this section broadens the scope of forecasting methods to include 
other predictors. One alternative approach to measuring market expectations is the use of 
survey data. While economists have used survey data extensively in measuring the risk 
premium embedded in foreign exchange futures (see Chinn and Frankel 1995), this 
approach has not been applied to oil futures, with the exception of recent work by Wu 
and McCallum (2005). Yet another approach is the use of more sophisticated 
econometric forecasting models of the spot price of crude oil.  
2.3.1. Other Candidate Forecasting Models 
Survey Forecasts 
Given the significance of crude oil to the international economy, it is surprising that there 
are few organizations that produce monthly forecasts of spot prices. In the oil industry, 
where the spot price of oil is critical to investment decisions, oil firms tend to make 
annual forecasts of future spot prices for horizons as long as 15-20 years, but these are 
 
  14 
not publicly available. The U.S. Department of Energy‟s International Energy Agency 
(IEA) uses a structural econometric model of crude oil supply and demand to produce 
quarterly forecasts of the spot price of oil, but these forecasts are available only 
beginning in late 2004. The Economist Intelligence Unit has produced annual forecasts 
since the 1990s for horizons of up to 5 years. None of these sources provides monthly 
forecasts. 
A standard source of monthly forecasts of the price of crude oil is Consensus 
Economics Inc., a U.K.-based company that compiles private sector forecasts in a variety 
of countries. Initially, the sample consisted of more than 100 private firms; it now 
contains about 70 firms. Of interest to us are the survey expectations for the 3- and 12-
month ahead spot price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil, which corresponds to the 
type and grade delivered under the NYMEX futures contract. The survey provides the 
arithmetic average, the minimum, the maximum, and the standard deviation for each 
survey month beginning in October 1989 and ending in February 2007. I use the 
arithmetic mean at the relevant horizon: 
(7)   
| ,
ˆ CF
t ht t hS S     3,12h   
Econometric Forecasts 
An alternative to modeling expectations of spot prices for crude oil is based on 
econometric models. One example of such econometric models is the random walk 
model without drift introduced earlier. In this section, I introduce the random walk with 
drift and the Hotelling model as additional competitors. Given that oil prices have been 
persistently trending upward (or downward) at times, it is natural to consider a random 
walk model with drift. One possibility is to estimate this drift recursively, resulting in the 
forecasting model:  
(8)   |ˆ 1tt h tS S     1,3,6,9,12h  
Alternatively, a local drift term may be estimated using rolling regressions: 
(9)  )1(ˆ )(|
l
tttht sSS    1,3,6,9,12h , 1, 3, 6, 9,12l    
where thtS |
ˆ
  is the forecast of the spot price at t+h; and 
)(1 lts is the geometric average 
of the monthly percent change for the preceding l months, i.e., the percent change in the 
spot price between t and t-l+1. This model postulates that traders extrapolate from the 
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spot price‟s recent behavior when they form expectations about the future spot price. The 
local drift model is appealing in that it may capture “short-term forecastability” that 
arises from local trends in the oil price data. 
An alternative approach is motivated by Hotelling‟s (1931) model, which predicts 
that the price of an exhaustible resource such as oil appreciates at the risk free rate of 
interest: 
(10)  | ,
ˆ (1 )
t h t t t h
S S i

    3,6,12h  
where ,t hi  refers to the interest rate at the relevant maturity h.
7
 Although the Hotelling 
model seems too stylized to generate realistic predictions, I include this method given 
recent evidence that the Hotelling model does well in forecasting the future spot price of 




2.3.2. Real-Time Forecast Accuracy of Other Forecasting Approaches 
In this subsection, I compare the real time forecast accuracy of models (7)-(10) to that of 
the no-change forecast in (2). Section 2.3 established that the no-change forecast tends to 
be more accurate than models based on the price of oil futures. An obvious question is 
whether the no-change forecast can be improved upon, for example, by using information 
on interest rates. 
Hotelling Model 
Row 7 in Tables 2, 3, and 5 shows that the random walk model has lower MSPE than the 
Hotelling model at horizons of 3 and 6 months, whereas at the 12-month horizon the 
ranking is reversed. This reversal is not statistically significant, however. Based on the 
MAPE, the no-change forecast is superior at all three horizons. The Hotelling forecasting 
model has systematically lower bias at all three horizons than the no-change forecast. It 
also is systematically better at predicting the sign of the change in oil prices than futures 
                                                 
7
 Assuming perfect competition, no arbitrage, and no uncertainty, oil companies extract oil at a rate that 
equates: (1) the value today of selling the oil less the costs of extraction; (2) and the present value of 
owning the oil, which, given the model‟s assumptions, is discounted at the risk free rate. In competitive 
equilibrium, oil companies extract crude oil at the socially optimal rate. 
8
 Specifically, we use the 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month constant-maturity Treasury bill rates from the 
Federal Reserve Board‟s website http://federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm 
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forecasts, although I cannot assess the statistical significance of the improvement, given 
that there is no variability at all in the sign forecast. 
Random Walk Models with Drift 
The next six rows in Tables 1-5 document that allowing for a drift in no case significantly 
lowers the MSPE of the random walk model, when the drift is estimated based on rolling 
regressions, and only in one case, when the drift is estimated recursively. Allowing for a 
drift lowers the MAPE at some horizons and for some models, but the gains are not 
systematic and different models work well for different horizons. Again, the Clark and 
West (2005) test rejects the null of no predictability in several cases (mainly at the nine-
month horizon). As discussed earlier, that rejection does not necessarily translate into 
accuracy gains in real time forecasting, as evidenced by the MAPE rankings. In some 
cases, allowing for a drift also improves significantly the ability to predict the sign of the 
change of the oil price at longer horizons, but only when the drift is estimated 
recursively. In general, the results for the random walk with drift are quite sensitive to the 
model specification and forecast horizon, and they do not account for the “specification 
mining” implicit in considering a large number of alternative models with drift (see Inoue 
and Kilian (2004) and the references therein). There is no evidence that such models 
dominate the no-change forecast. 
Professional Survey Forecasts 
The last row in Tables 2 and 5 shows that the consensus survey forecast has much higher 
MSPE than the no-change forecast at both the 3-month and 12-month horizons. It also 
has a larger bias and higher MAPE and there is no statistically significant evidence that it 
is better at predicting signs than a coin flip. The survey forecast is also inferior to the 
futures forecasts, suggesting that survey respondents do not rely on futures price data 
alone in forming their expectations. 
2.3.3. Why the No-Change Forecast Is a Plausible Measure of the Expected Spot 
Price 
The central result of section 3.2 is that no-change forecasts of the price of oil tend to be 
more accurate than forecasts based on econometric models and more accurate than survey 
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forecasts.
9
 This result is consistent with views among oil experts. For example, Peter 
Davies, chief economist of British Petroleum, has noted that “we cannot forecast oil 
prices with any degree of accuracy over any period whether short or long” (see Davies 
2007). The favorable forecasting performance of the no-change forecast also is consistent 
with the observed high persistence of the nominal spot price of oil (see, for example, 
Diebold and Kilian 2000). The high autocorrelation of commodity prices in general has 
been widely recognized in the literature (see, for example, Deaton and Laroque 1992, 
1996). Finally, it is important to stress that the superior forecast accuracy of the random 
walk model without drift does not contradict theoretical results in the literature that oil 
prices are endogenous with respect to global macroeconomic conditions (see, for 
example, Barsky and Kilian 2002). The first point to keep in mind is that macroeconomic 
determinants such as U.S. interest rates, U.S. inflation, or global economic growth are but 
one of many determinants of the price of oil. For example, many of the major oil price 
increases in recent decades have been associated with unforeseen political disturbances in 
the Middle East and rising concerns about future oil supply shortfalls. Hence, one would 
not expect forecasting models based on macroeconomic fundamentals alone to be 
successful in practice. The second point to bear in mind is that predictability that exists in 
population may be difficult to exploit in real time in finite samples. The link from 
macroeconomic fundamentals to the price of oil is complicated and likely to be nonlinear. 
Even if the spot price of crude oil does not truly follow a random walk, random walk 
forecasts tend to be attractive in terms of their mean-squared prediction error (MSPE) 
since the reduction in variance from excluding other predictors in small samples will 
typically more than offset the omitted variable bias. Thus, the superior forecast accuracy 
of the no-change forecast does not invalidate economic models of the crude oil market.  
                                                 
9
 This result differs from at least some earlier studies. For example, Chernenko et al. (2004) report evidence 
that futures-based forecasts have marginally lower MSPE than the no-change forecast at horizons of 3, 6 
and 12 months. In related work, Wu and McCallum (2005) find that futures prices are generally inferior to 
the no-change forecast, but report that spread regressions have lower MSPE than the no-change forecast at 
short horizons. These findings do not contradict my results. The differences in MSPE rankings can be 
traced mainly to differences in the sample period. The sample period considered in my paper is longer than 
in any previous study. Further sensitivity analysis suggests that evidence of accuracy gains, sometimes 
obtained in samples shorter than mine, tends to vanish when the full sample is examined. 
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2.4. Why Is the MSPE of Oil-Futures Prices So Large Relative to the No-Change 
Forecast? 
The preceding section demonstrated that under the MSPE metric the best predictor of the 
nominal price of oil is the no-change forecast. This section examines in greater detail the 
differences between the no-change forecast and the forecast based on oil futures prices. A 
formal analysis of what precisely goes wrong with the oil futures forecast will help 
motivate the theoretical analysis of the oil spot and futures markets in the next section. 
For this purpose it is convenient to express the deviation of the futures price from the no-
change forecast in percentage terms as ( ) .ht tf s  
There are two possible reasons for the higher MSPE of 
( )h
tF  relative to .tS  One is 
higher forecast bias; the other is a higher forecast variance. In Table 7, I first evaluate the 
possibility that 
( )h
tF  is different on average from .tS  For expository purposes, I focus on 
the 3-month and 12-month horizons. My sample period is 1989.1-2007.2, as a contiguous 
time series for the 12-month spread becomes available only starting in 1989.1. Using 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors, on average both 
the 3-month and 12-month spread are statistically different from zero at the 1% level. 
Although the rejection is decisive, Table 7 shows that the mean deviation is 
comparatively small in magnitude (about 1% at the 3-month horizon and below 5% at the 
12 month horizon).   
Whereas the bias of futures prices relative to the no-change forecast may seem 
small, the variability about the no-change forecast is not. As Table 7 shows, at any point 
in time, the discrepancy between the futures price and the spot price may be very large 
and go in either direction. It is this variability of the deviation of futures prices from spot 
prices rather than the differences in mean that drives the larger MSPE of futures-based 
forecasts and that makes the use of such oil price forecasts inadvisable. The time-
variation in the spread is not only large, but highly persistent. In Table 7, I measure this 
persistence by modeling the spread as an autoregression with the lag order selected by the 
Akaike Information Criterion. Based on the fitted autoregressive models, I compute the 
sum of the autoregressive coefficients as a measure of persistence as suggested by 
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Andrews and Chen (1994). The estimated persistence for the 3-month spread in the first 
column is 0.74, whereas that for the 12-month spread is 0.81. 
The evidence in Table 7 is important because it suggests that the key to 
understanding the poor predictive accuracy of oil futures prices relative to the no-change 
forecast is to understand the causes of the excess variability of oil futures prices relative 
to the spot price of oil. The existence of such large fluctuations in the oil futures spread 
may seem surprising at first, considering the much lower variability and persistence of 
the futures spread in the widely studied foreign exchange futures market. The spread of 
foreign exchange futures prices over the spot exchange rate is well explained by the 
bilateral interest rate differential because the spread captures the opportunity cost of 
holding assets in one currency as opposed to another. This covered interest rate parity 
result has been documented, for example, by Taylor (1989). Considering the typical size 
of interest rate differentials, the spread in major foreign exchange markets tends to be 
small. This point is illustrated in Figure 3. The oil futures spread is far more variable than 
the U.S.-U.K. foreign exchange futures spread. 
In the next section I propose a theoretical explanation of this discrepancy. I 
observe that the difference between the oil futures price and the expected spot price of oil 
is not accounted for by the interest rate alone, but that it also reflects the value that firms 
derive from having ready access to oil, a fact commonly referred to as the convenience 
yield. The presence of this convenience yield makes the analysis of oil futures markets 
fundamentally different from the analysis of the market for foreign exchange futures. I 
propose a theoretical model that explains the persistent and large fluctuations in the 
spread in terms of fluctuations in the marginal convenience yield. The model implies that 
fluctuations in the marginal convenience yield can be directly linked to shifting 
fundamentals in the form of expectation shifts about future oil supply shortfalls. Whereas 
concerns about future supply shortfalls may in principle arise in any commodity market, 
there is reason to believe that such concerns historically have been particularly relevant in 
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2.5. A Two-Country General Equilibrium Model of the Oil Futures and Oil Spot 
Markets 
2.5.1. Model Description 
The model in this section can be viewed as a generalization of the analysis in Pindyck 
(1994, 2001). There are two countries, the United States and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia 
trades its oil endowment with the United States in exchange for a consumption good that 
the United States produces from oil to be delivered at the end of the period. The United 
States consumes some of the final consumption good and sells the rest to Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia is treated as an endowment economy in recognition of the fact that capacity 
constraints have been binding in global crude oil production in recent years (see Kilian 
2008). The existence of capacity constraints implies that extracting less oil today does not 
permit more oil to be extracted in the future. Each period, Saudi Arabia receives a 
random oil endowment .t  The oil endowment in period t  is t t     with probability 
 ; and ˆ
t t     with probability 1   and ˆ (1 )t t     such that ( ) .tE   The 
variance of the oil endowment is 
2.   
In each period, the United States chooses: (1) next period‟s above-ground 
inventory holdings of oil ( tI ); (2) the number of oil futures contracts that deliver one 
barrel of oil next period; (3) the number of risk-free one-period bonds that yield 
, 1(1 ) ,t tr   and (4) the quantity of oil to use in the production of the consumption good. 
Saudi Arabia chooses the number of oil futures contracts and the number of risk-free 
bonds it wishes to hold. The price of the consumption good in period t  is tP  and the spot 
price of oil is tS . The price of the consumption good is the numeraire. 
2.5.2. The United States’ Demand for Oil 
The United States chooses the amount of oil to use in the production of the consumption 
good; and the amount of oil to store as above-ground inventory. Imported oil can be 
transformed into the consumption good using the production function ( )tF Z , where tZ  
is the quantity of oil the United States uses in producing the consumption good. I 
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postulate that ( ) 0tF Z  , ( ) 0tF Z  , 
( ) 0tF Z  , and 
0






  . The United 
States chooses 
tZ  such that the marginal product of oil equals the real price of oil in 
terms of the consumption good 
 
(11)    ( )
t t t
S P F Z , 
which implies the demand schedule: 
 
    
1( , ) ( )t t t tZ S P F S P
 . 
The resource constraint for crude oil is given by the identity 
     ,t t t tI Z S P   . 
Re-interpreting equation (11) as a demand function in ,tI  I obtain the inverse net 
demand function expressed as a function of the random Saudi oil endowment and the 
change in inventories: 
( ) ( , )t t t t t
t
S
F I D I
P
      . 
If t tS P  is drawn on the vertical axis and tI  on the horizontal axis, ( , )t tD I   is 
upward -sloping in tI . 
2.5.3. No-Arbitrage Condition 1: The Oil Futures Market 
If I am willing to impose, in addition, that both the United States and Saudi Arabia are 
risk neutral, as Bernanke (2004) explicitly assumed, then by the no-arbitrage condition 
that the expected return from holding inventories must equal the real price of oil today, it 
follows that 
    
   1 1 1t t t t t tE F P E S P   .  
Using a linear Taylor series approximation, I obtain that 
 1t t tF E S  
Thus, the futures price will be an approximately unbiased predictor of the spot price.  
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2.5.4. No-Arbitrage Condition 2: The Bond Market 
Under risk neutrality, the real value of a bond today must equal the discounted real 
present value of a bond tomorrow: 
(12)   
, 1
1 , 1 1
1 1 1 1
(1 )
(1 )
t t t t
t t t t t t
r E E





   
      
   
. 
A linear Taylor series approximation implies that: 
(12 )   
, 1 , 11 (1 ) 1 1 1tt ttr r        
2.5.5. No-Arbitrage Condition 3: The Market for Storage 
The distinguishing feature of my model is the existence of a market for storage. Storage 
takes the form of holding above-ground oil inventories. The term convenience yield in the 
literature refers to the benefits arising from access to crude oil in the form of inventories 
such as the ability to avoid disruptions of the production process or the ability to meet 
unexpected demand for the final good. The convenience yield is a commonly used 
modeling device (see, for example, Brennan 1991; Fama and French 1988; Gibson and 
Schwartz 1990; Pindyck 1994).  Its microeconomic foundations have been discussed in 
Ramey (1989), Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995), Considine (1997), among others. I 
denote the convenience yield by
2( , ).tg g I   Let 
2
1 1( , )tg g I  denote the marginal 
convenience yield associated with holding additional above-ground inventories between 
t  and 1.t   Following the commodity pricing literature, I impose that 
1 11
0, 0,g g  and 
12 0,g   where ig  denotes the derivative of g with respect to its 
thi  argument and ijg  the 
cross-partial derivative of g with respect to the arguments i  and .j  As increases in the 
variance make production shortfalls more likely, the marginal convenience yield from 
holding inventories is increasing in the variance. Throughout the paper I also postulate 
that the Inada condition  








   
holds, which ensures that the U.S. holds strictly positive inventories. With 
2
1( , )tg I   on 
the vertical axis and above-ground inventory holdings on the horizontal axis, the 
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intersection of the 
2
1( , )tg I   curve and inventory holdings tI  describes the equilibrium 
in the market for storage. 
 Abstracting from costs of storage, no arbitrage implies that storing a barrel of oil 
above ground for one period and simultaneously selling short a one-period futures 
contract is a risk-free strategy: 
1 1
, 1 1 , 1 1
1 1 1 1
Return from storing oil Return from selling
futures contract
(1 ) (1 )t t t t t tt t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
S S F S S F
r g E E E r g E
P P P P P P
 
 
   
       
               
        
. 
By no arbitrage, the returns to this investment must equal the return on investing the same 
amount at the risk-free rate: 
, 1 , 1 1
1
(1 )t t tt t t t t
t t t
S S F





     
 
. 
Since  1t t t t tE F P F P   given equation (12), I obtain: 
(13)    , 1 , 1 1(1 ) (1 )
t t





      
Equation (13) shows that the difference between the capitalized real spot price and the 
real futures price is equal to the capitalized marginal convenience yield. 
2.5.6. A Permanent Mean-Preserving Spread of Oil Endowments 
In this subsection, I derive two comparative statics results under risk neutrality. The first 
result is that an increase in uncertainty about the future oil supply shortfalls immediately 
raises the real spot price of oil; the second result is that under plausible assumptions this 
increase in uncertainty lowers the oil futures spread. I model the increase in uncertainty 
as a mean-preserving increase in the spread of the oil endowment shock. The thought 
experiment is an increase in .t   
The mean preserving spread helps us abstracts from changes in the conditional 
mean of oil supplies and focus on changes in the conditional variance. The motivation for 
this modeling choice is best seen by focusing on the example of the Persian Gulf War. 
Events such as the invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 have two distinct effects. First, 
they cause a reduction in expected oil supply. This oil supply shock represents a change 
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in the conditional mean of oil supplies. It has been documented in the literature that such 
a shock indeed occurred in 1990, but that this supply shock fails to explain the bulk of the 
movements in the real price of oil in 1990/91. Second, there is an increase in uncertainty 
about future oil supply shortfalls. Indirect evidence that the price spike of 1990/91 was 
driven by increased uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls has been presented in 
Kilian (2008). To keep the model tractable, I model this increased uncertainty as an 
increase in the conditional variance of oil supplies, implicitly abstracting from the global 
business cycle or any other change in the conditional mean. 
Result 1: An Increase in Uncertainty Increases the Real Spot Price  
I solve the no-arbitrage condition (13) for t tS P  and substitute for  , 11 (1 )t t tr P  from 















   1 1t t t t t tE F P E S P   by the no-arbitrage condition in the futures market. Using 
equation (12) to substitute for the real price of oil in terms of the marginal product, I 
arrive at: 
 
  21 1 1( ) ( ) ( , )t t t t t tF I EF I g I           , 
 
implying that the United States equates the marginal benefits and marginal costs of these 
inventory holdings. The mean-preserving spread drives a wedge between the left-hand 
and right-hand side of this intertemporal marginal efficiency condition. Because (.)F  is 
convex, the mean-preserving spread increases  1 1( )t t tE F I    by Jensen‟s inequality 
(Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). It also increases the marginal willingness to pay for 
inventories, given by
2
1( , )tg I  . To re-establish intertemporal marginal efficiency, the 
United States must increase its inventory holdings such that equality is re-established.  
 Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic adjustment process of the real price of oil and of 
U.S. oil inventories in response to an exogenous increase in uncertainty about future oil 
supply shortfalls. Figure 4a plots the marginal convenience yield. Figure 4b shows the 
corresponding inverse U.S. demand function for oil. In the model, date t  inventory 
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holdings are determined by the quantity of inventories the U.S. decided to hold at time 
1.t  Suppose that we are at point A  in Figure 4a at the beginning of the period. When 
there is a mean-preserving increase in the endowment spread, the marginal convenience 
yield schedule shifts upwards instantaneously, because the U.S. values each unit of 
inventory more than it did prior to the increase in uncertainty. We move along the 
inventory schedule from point A to point .B  Consequently, by the concavity of its 
production function, the United States finds it optimal to increase its future inventory 
holdings relative to last period‟s inventory holdings. Thus 1t tI I

   and 
1 0t t tI I I

    . This implies a decrease in the real price of oil over time, starting from 
point B , as the United States moves along the marginal convenience yield schedule 
towards point .C  The accumulation of additional inventories is associated with a decline 
in the real price of oil, as the marginal convenience yield falls. The real price of oil in the 
new long-run equilibrium will be higher than its level at 1,t   but lower than its impact 
level. To summarize, I expect the real price of oil to overshoot in response to increased 
uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls, whereas inventories will be accumulated 
only gradually over time. The overshooting result for the real price of oil is analogous to 
the overshooting of the exchange rate in the Dornbusch (1976) model. It is driven by the 
assumption that inventories are predetermined and will not adjust fully to an increase in 
uncertainty on impact. 
Result 2: An Increase in Uncertainty Decreases the Oil Futures Spread 
By rearranging equation (13), I obtain an expression for the spread: 
(14)   
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A sufficient condition for the oil futures spread to decrease in response to a mean-
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Since , 1 0t t tdr d  , the first two terms in this expression are zero. The sign of the 
expression depends on the relative magnitudes of (1) the decrease in the marginal 
convenience yield associated with the increase in inventories triggered by the shock to 
the endowment distribution; and (2) the increase in the marginal convenience yield 
associated with the increase in 
2
  triggered by the same shock. The spread declines if 
and only if 
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I can express both 2
t
d d   and t td I d  in terms of the model‟s parameters and show 
that expression (15) is equivalent to: 
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Hence, for a given stock of inventories and increase in t , the spread will decline, 
provided 12g  is large enough. The term 12g  measures the shift in the marginal 
convenience yield induced by the mean-preserving spread. It represents the sensitivity of 
the marginal value of inventories in response to an increase in uncertainty. The shift of 
1g reflects the fact that following an increase in uncertainty each unit of inventory has 
greater value as insurance against supply shortfalls. In other words, the oil futures spread 
will decline if agents‟ willingness to pay for an extra barrel of oil to be used as insurance 
against oil supply shortfalls increases sufficiently in response to an unanticipated shift in 
uncertainty. It is well-documented that during past uncertainty shocks in the crude oil 
market, traders were willing to pay exorbitant prices to procure extra stocks of oil (see, 
for example, Penrose 1976; Terzian 1985). Thus, large values of 12g  seem empirically 
plausible. Uncertainty shocks driven by exogenous events provide an economic 
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explanation for the large and persistent fluctuations in the spread that undermine the 
forecasting accuracy of oil futures prices.
10
 
2.6. Model Evaluation 
2.6.1. Test 1: Can the Model Explain the Poor Forecast Accuracy of Oil Futures 
Prices? 
The theoretical model predicts that under risk neutrality  ( )ht t t hF E S  , which is 
approximately the result asserted by Bernanke (2004). Given this result, it may seem 
puzzling at first that the forecast accuracy of oil futures prices is poor in practice. This 
result follows naturally from the model, however. Sections 2 and 3 established that the 
best proxy for  t t hE S  is the no-change forecast .tS  There is no presumption in the 
theoretical model that   .t t h tE S S   In fact, equation (14) implies that in equilibrium
( )h
tF  
may be larger than, smaller than or equal to .tS  Thus, the evidence in Table 7 that on 
average over my sample period 
( )h
tF  is slightly smaller than tS  is fully consistent with 
the theoretical model. Nevertheless, on average the (approximate) model expectation 
( )h
tF  is fairly close to the econometric expectation .tS   
The reason that 
( )h
tF  is a poor predictor is not so much that it is different on 
average from ,tS  but that it fluctuates widely relative to .tS  At any point in time, the 
discrepancy between the futures price and the spot price may be very large and go in 
either direction. Taking the spot price of crude oil to be $65, about its level in late March 
2007, for example, the minimum and maximum value of the 12-month spread implies 
that the futures price may differ from the best predictor by as much as $20 in one 
                                                 
10
 Earlier I documented that the oil futures spread is highly persistent, but mean reverting (see Table 7). I 
also documented that the no-change forecast is the best predictor of the nominal spot price of oil. The 
conclusion that under plausible conditions the mean-reverting spread is associated with changes in the 
precautionary demand component of the spot price may seem to contradict the random walk result. This is 
not the case. First, the result about the forecast accuracy refers to the nominal price of oil, whereas the 
comparative statics result is for the real price of oil. Second, the forecasting results are for total spot price 
of oil, whereas the results of this section are only for one of the components of the real price of oil. Third, 
as Diebold and Kilian (2000) demonstrate, for autoregressive processes with degrees of persistence in the 
range documented in Table 7 an incorrectly specified random walk model will tend to have lower MSPE 
than the correct mean-reverting model in small samples.
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direction or by as much as $18 in the other (see Table 7). Thus, policymakers relying on 
oil futures prices are likely to overestimate or underestimate the expected price of oil 
substantially at any given point in time, and the fact that these mistakes largely average 
out in the long run is of little consolation. Put differently, it is not that Bernanke‟s (2004) 
assertion that oil futures prices can be viewed as expected spot prices is necessarily 
wrong, but that it of limited use in practice given the large fluctuations in the futures 
price relative to the best predictor. My theoretical model provides an explanation of this 
excess variability. In the model, fluctuations in the spread arise naturally from shifts in 
uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls and will be indicative of fluctuations in the 
spot price of oil driven by precautionary demand for crude oil, provided 12g  is large 
enough.
11
 Hence, the theoretical model helps us understand the poor forecast accuracy of 
oil futures prices. Whether this explanation is empirically plausible is a question that I 
turn to next. 
2.6.2. Test 2: Does the Proposed Indicator Move as Expected During Known 
Episodes of Uncertainty Shifts? 
One way of judging the empirical content of the model is to verify that the spread moves 
in the expected direction at times of major unforeseen events such as the outbreak of the 
wars. In Figure 5, I focus on several clearly defined events in recent history that should 
have been associated with shifts in the market‟s uncertainty about future oil supply 
shortfalls such as the Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War (which should have caused 
the spread to fall) and the Asian financial crisis and 9/11 (which should have caused the 
spread to increase as world demand for crude oil fell, making a shortfall less likely). 
Clearly, expectations shifts of the type embodied in my theoretical model are not the only 
possible reason for shifts in the spread, but arguably they are the most important reason.  
Figure 5 plots the negative of the spread for 1989.1-2007.2 by horizon. This 
normalization allows us to interpret positive spikes as increases in the precautionary 
                                                 
11
 Strictly speaking, this link holds if and only if a change in demand for oil inventories is confronted with 
an inelastic supply of oil. In the model, this inelasticity is represented in the form of an endowment 
structure. While this assumption may be unrealistic for the early 1980s, throughout much of the sample that 
I consider below this is a reasonable assumption. Kilian (2008) documents that capacity constraints in 
world crude oil production have been binding since the early 1990s. 
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demand component of the real spot price. The plot confirms the conclusion in Kilian 
(2008) that the sharp spike in oil prices during the Persian Gulf War was driven by 
expectations shifts reflected first in higher precautionary demand, as Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, and then in lower precautionary demand, as the U.S. troop presence in the region 
increased (also see Kilian 2007a). Likewise, the spike after mid-2002 in the period 
leading up to the 2003 Iraq War is as expected, given that the Iraq War was anticipated 
by the market starting in the summer of 2002 (Barsky and Kilian 2004). The plot also 
indicates that the temporary decline in oil prices following the Asian crisis (and its 
reversal after 1999) reflected fluctuations in precautionary demand.  There is a similar but 
smaller temporary decline following the adverse demand shock associated with 9/11. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the spike in 1996 was associated with concerns about 
tight oil supplies and the spike in 2000 with concerns arising from strong demand for 
crude oil. In addition, the plot suggests a persistent decline in precautionary demand in 
recent years. Such a decline seems highly implausible on a priori grounds, given that 
recent years have been characterized by widespread concerns about future oil supply 
shortfalls, a point to which I will return below. 
2.6.3. Test 3: How does the Proposed Indicator Compare to Alternative Measures of 
Precautionary Demand Shifts? 
The indicator of expectations-driven oil price increases proposed in this paper is not the 
only possible measure. Recently, an alternative measure of the component of the spot 
price of crude oil that is driven by shocks to precautionary demand has been proposed by 
Kilian (2007a,b) based on different data and a different methodology. Unlike the measure 
developed in this paper, that estimate was based on a structural VAR decomposition of 
the real price of crude oil. The structural representation of the underlying trivariate 
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Where p denotes the lag order, t  is the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated 
structural innovations and tz  a vector variable including the percent change in global 
crude oil production, a (suitably detrended) index of global real economic activity that 
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captures fluctuations in the global demand for all industrial commodities (including crude 
oil), and the real price of oil (in that order), measured at monthly frequency.  
Let te  denote the reduced form VAR innovations such that 
1
0t te A 
 . The 
structural innovations are derived from the reduced form innovations by imposing 




. The identifying assumptions are that (1) crude oil supply 
will not respond to oil demand shocks within the month, given the costs of adjusting oil 
production and the uncertainty about the state of the crude oil market; that (2) increases 
in the real price of oil driven by shocks that are specific to the oil market will not lower 
global real economic activity within the month. In this model, innovations to the real 
price of oil that cannot be explained by oil supply shocks or demand shocks that are 
common to all industrial commodities by construction must be demand shocks that are 
specific to the oil market. The latter oil-specific demand shock by construction captures 
fluctuations in precautionary demand for oil driven by fears about the availability of 
future oil supplies. Kilian (2007a) makes the case that this shock effectively can be 
interpreted as a precautionary demand shock, given the absence of plausible alternative 
interpretations and given the time path of this shock during specific historical episodes, 
during which I would expect precautionary demand to shift.  
The structural VAR model postulates a vertical short-run supply curve for crude 
oil and a downward sloping short-run demand curve that is being shifted by innovations 
to the business cycle in global industrial commodity markets as well as shifts in the 
demand for oil that are specific to the oil market such as shifts in the precautionary 
demand for crude oil. Given these assumptions, one can use the structural moving 
average decomposition of the VAR model to construct a time series of the component of 
the real price of oil that can be attributed to shifts in the precautionary demand for crude 
oil in response to changes in the uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls. While it is 
not possible to compare this VAR-based measure of the precautionary demand 
component of the spot price to the futures-based measure for the full sample period of 
1973-2006 considered in Kilian (2007a), given the limited availability of oil futures price 
data, I may compare these two measures for the period 1989.1-2006.12, which includes 
several major oil price spikes. Since the oil futures-based measure is essentially an index 
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and the VAR-based measure is not, the appropriate metric of comparison is their 
contemporaneous correlation.  
Table 8 shows that the two measures in general are highly correlated despite the 
differences in their method of construction. For the sample period of 1989.1 through 
2006.12, the correlation ranges from 39% at the 3-month horizon to 61% at the 12-month 
horizon. The fit improves monotonically with the horizon, consistent with the view that 
shifts in precautionary demand are primarily concerned with expectations beyond the 
short run. Thus, I focus on the 12-month spread. A correlation of 61% between two 
independently constructed measures of the fluctuations in the spot price of oil driven by 
precautionary demand is remarkably high. The correlation is even higher if I exclude the 
last three years of data, for which the spread seems implausibly high, as discussed above. 
Table 8 shows that, excluding the last three years, the correlation of the two measures 
rises to 79% at the 12 month horizon. A correlation of near 80% for most of the sample is 
evidence both of the predictive power of my theoretical model of the oil futures and spot 
markets and of the realism of the identifying assumptions underlying the VAR-based 
measure.  
Not only does the correlation weaken after 2003.12, but the spread data and the 
VAR-based measure of the precautionary demand component of the spot price of oil 
paint a somewhat different picture (see Figure 6). Whereas the VAR-based measure on 
average remains at a high level after 2003.12, consistent with the perception of sustained 
uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls, the futures-based measure systematically 
declines. This evidence casts further doubt on the credibility of the negative of the spread 
as an indicator of fluctuations in the precautionary demand component of the spot price 
over the last three years of the sample. These observations suggest that a structural 
change may have occurred around 2003.12 that is beyond the scope of the theoretical 
model in section 5. Indeed, it has been suggested in the financial press that the nature of 
the oil futures markets has changed in recent years, as hedge funds and other investors 
with no ties to the oil industry attempted to capitalize on rising oil prices. Data from the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (not shown to conserve space) shed light on the 
share of speculators among oil futures traders since 1989 and reveal an unprecedented 
increase in speculative activities after 2003.12. To the extent that increased speculative 
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trading tends to raise the price of oil futures more than the spot price (and hence increases 
the spread), this fact might provide an explanation for the weakening of the correlations 
at the end of the sample. Establishing such a link is left for future research. 
2.6.4. Test 4: Does the VAR Response of the Real Price of Oil Match the Model 
Predictions? 
Another implication of the theoretical model is that the real price of oil will overshoot in 
response to a mean-preserving spread, while inventory holdings will increase only 
gradually. If the Kilian (2007a) measure of the precautionary demand shock is valid, the 
response of the real price of oil in that VAR should exhibit overshooting, as predicted by 
the theoretical model. Figure 7 confirms that the response to an oil-specific demand 
shock indeed displays overshooting, suggesting that the interpretation of this shock as a 
precautionary demand shock is justified and indirectly supporting the interpretation of the 
futures-based indicator as a measure of expectations shifts. There is no evidence of such a 
pattern in response to other oil demand or oil supply shocks. 
2.6.5. Implications for Crude Oil Inventories 
Whereas I have focused on the empirical relationship between increased concerns about 
future oil supply shortfalls and the precautionary demand component of the real spot 
price of oil, the model also has implications for the behavior of inventories in response to 
increased uncertainty. Testing these implications is not straightforward, given that 
inventories move for many reasons other than shifts in uncertainty about future oil supply 
shortfalls. First, whereas for the real price of oil I was able to use a VAR decomposition 
to focus specifically on the precautionary demand component of the real price, no similar 
measure of the precautionary demand component in oil inventories exists, making it 
impossible to identify the consequences of precautionary demand shocks for inventories. 
Second, inventory data are trending, and measures of the comovement between the 
precautionary demand component of the spot price and inventories tend to be sensitive to 
the method of detrending.  
There is, however, anecdotal evidence from oil industry experts documenting that 
shifts in precautionary demand coincide with a strong motive for inventory accumulation. 
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This situation has been aptly described by Terzian (1985) in the context of the 1979 oil 
price shock: 
Spot deals became more and more infrequent. The independent refineries, with no 
access to direct supply from producers, began to look desperately for oil on the 
so-called „free market‟. But from the beginning of November, most of the big oil 
companies invoked force majeure and reduced their oil deliveries to third parties 
by 10% to 30%, when they did not cut them off altogether. Everybody was 
anxious to hang on to as much of their own oil as possible, until the situation had 
become clearer. The shortage was purely psychological, or „precautionary‟ as one 
dealer put it. (p. 260) 
 
Penrose (1976, p. 46) describes a similar hoarding phenomenon in the period leading up 
to the 1973 oil price shock, as oil companies became concerned with the possibility of 
being expropriated. In her words, “the major oil companies became increasingly cautious 
about outside sales as uncertainty increased”. These accounts are consistent with the 
implications of my theoretical model. 
2.7. Conclusion 
I introduced a two-country, multi-period general equilibrium model of both the spot 
market and the futures market for crude oil to provide fresh insights about the 
interpretation of oil futures prices and related statistics such as the oil futures spread. The 
key insights can be summarized as follows: First, it is widely believed that prices of oil 
futures are accurate predictors of forecast spot prices in the MSPE sense. Using 
observations up to February of 2007, I showed that the price of crude oil futures is not an 
accurate predictor of the spot price of crude oil. Many users of oil futures-based forecasts 
are aware of this caveat and understand that futures-based forecasts may be poor, but still 
believe that they provide the best available forecast of spot prices of crude oil. I showed 
this not to be the case. Futures-based forecasts are inferior to simple and easy-to-use 
forecasting methods such as the no-change forecast. No-change forecasts are also more 
accurate than commercial survey-based forecasts.  
Second, I showed that the large MSPE of oil futures-based forecasts is driven not 
by the bias, but by the variability of the futures price about the spot price. I documented 
large and time-varying deviations of oil futures prices from the spot price of oil, as 
measured by the oil futures spread. For example, given a spot price of $65, the 12-month 
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futures price may deviate as much as $20 from the expected spot price or as little as $0, 
which helps explain the poor forecasting accuracy of oil futures prices.  
Third, my analysis demonstrates that fluctuations in the oil futures spread are 
larger and more persistent than fluctuations in the spread of foreign exchange futures. I 
showed that this anomaly is linked to the presence of a marginal convenience yield in the 
oil futures market that is absent in the foreign exchange futures market. I proposed a 
theoretical model of the oil spot market and oil futures market that incorporates this 
marginal convenience yield. The model implies that the oil futures spread is directly 
linked to shifts in oil market fundamentals. I showed that shifts in the uncertainty about 
future oil supply shortfalls cause fluctuations in the oil futures spread not found in models 
of the foreign exchange futures market. My model explains the excess variability of oil 
futures prices relative to the no-change forecast and the resulting poor forecast accuracy 
of oil futures prices. 
Fourth, I showed that, under plausible conditions, the oil futures spread will 
decline, as the precautionary demand component of the real spot price of crude oil 
increases. Thus, the negative of the spread may be viewed as an indicator of fluctuations 
in the real price of crude oil driven by precautionary demand for oil. The time path of the 
oil futures spread since 1989 suggested major shifts in precautionary demand for oil 
during the Persian Gulf War and following the Asian crisis, for example. These results 
provided independent evidence of how shifts in market expectations about future oil 
supply shortfalls affect the spot price of crude oil. Such expectation shifts have been 
difficult to quantify, yet play an important role in explaining oil price fluctuations (Kilian 
2008). In addition, I documented that my measure of oil price movements driven by 
uncertainty shifts matches up well with independently obtained VAR based measures, 
and that my model predicts the overshooting of the real price of oil found in VAR 
analysis. My analysis also is consistent with anecdotal evidence of hoarding in oil 
inventory markets during times of crisis. 
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Notes: The forecast evaluation period is 1991.1-2007.2. The initial estimation window is 
1983.4-1990.12. For regressions based on 6-month futures prices the estimation window 
begins in 1983.10; for the 9-month futures price in 1986.12; for the 12-month futures 
price in 1989.1. ( )htF is the futures price that matures in h periods; ,t mi  is the m month 
interest rate; and ( )lts  denotes the trailing geometric average of the monthly percent 
change for l months. p-values are in parentheses. All p-values refer to pairwise tests of 
the null of a random walk without drift. Comparisons of nonnested models without 
estimated parameters are based on the DM-test of Diebold and Mariano (2005) with 
N(0,1) critical values. Nested model comparisons with estimated parameters are based on 
Clark and West (2006). For the rolling regression estimates of the random walk with drift 
I use N(0,1) critical values under quadratic loss; for recursive estimates under quadratic 
loss and for all estimates under absolute loss I use bootstrap critical values as described in 
Clark and West. The sign test in the last column is based on Pesaran and Timmermann 
(1992). 
 
  36 
















































 (1)ˆ1 l n ( / )
t t t







 (1)1 ln( / )
t t t









































































  37 
















































 ( 3 )ˆ1 l n ( / )
t t t







 (3)1 ln( / )
t t t



































































































Notes: See Table 2-1. 
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Notes: See Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-6: Asymptotic p-Values for Forecast Efficiency Regressions 
Horizon ̂  ̂  0 : 0H   0 : 1H    0











































Notes: For the 3- and 6-month regressions, the sample period is 1989.4-2007.2. For the 12-
month regression, the sample is 1990.1-2007.2. All t-and Wald-tests have been computed 
based on HAC standard errors. 
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Table 2-7: Time Series Features of the Spread 
(Percent) 







Mean Abs.  
Deviation 
2.72 8.89 
Max 12.3 30.1 
Min -10.1 -27.7 
Persistence 0.74 0.81 
Notes: The sample for the 3-month forecasts is 1983.4-2007.2; and that for the 12-month forecast 
is 1990.1-2007.2, reflecting the data constraints. The p-values of the test for a zero mean are based 
on HAC standard errors. The measure of persistence is the sum of the autoregressive coefficients 
proposed by Andrews and Chen (1994). The autoregressive lag order is determined using the AIC 
with an upper bound of 24 lags. 
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Table 2-8: Contemporaneous Correlation of the Negative Spread and the VAR Estimate of 









Notes: Computed based on Figure 5 and the VAR estimates of the precautionary deman component of the 
spot price of crude oil in Kilian (2007).  
 
Horizon 1989.1-2006.12 1989.1-2003.12 
3 39.1 57.9 
6 49.7 69.9 
9 56.4 75.8 
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Figure 2-2: Volume of NYMEX Oil Futures Contracts 
 
Source: Price-data.com 
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Notes: The interest rates are end-of-month Treasury bill rates from the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Board
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Figure 2-4a: The Effect of an Increase in Uncertainty on the Marginal Convenience Yield 
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VAR-Based Precautionary Demand Component of Spot Price




















Notes: The spread has been scaled by -1.5 to improve the readability of the graph. Since the spread is essentially an index that transformation does not involve 


























Figure 2-7: Response of the Real Price of Oil to a Positive Precautionary Demand 
Shock 
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Did Adhering to the Gold Standard Reduce the Cost of Capital? 
3.1. Introduction 
Governments cannot simultaneously maintain an open capital market, retain monetary 
policy autonomy, and fix the exchange rate. This trilemma forces governments to make 
trade-offs among these goals by choosing two of the three objectives (Obstfeld et al. 
2005). In the 19
th
 century, governments opted for the perceived benefits of open capital 
markets and fixed exchange rates at the cost of an independent monetary policy. 
The costs of the gold standard are well known. For example, Temin (1991), 
Eichengreen (1992), and Bernanke (1995) lay much of the blame for the spread and 
severity of the Great Depression on the gold standard. On the other hand, the benefits of 
the gold standard remain the subject of debate. Until recently the most widespread theory 
viewed a country‟s adherence to the gold standard as a credible signal of a country‟s 
commitment to prudent fiscal and monetary policy (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). This 
“good-housekeeping” interpretation of the gold standard generates a testable implication: 
Countries that tied their currencies to gold should have been rewarded with a lower cost 
of capital. Available 19
th
 century asset data were too sparse for researchers to evaluate 
this hypothesis directly by comparing the returns of assets issued by countries on and off 
gold. Instead, past tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis compared observable 
coupon yields or capital flows between countries. These data have proven insufficient to 
resolve the question. Researchers have reached different conclusions on the effect of the 
gold standard on borrowing costs depending upon the choice of sample countries, 
empirical specification, and fiscal and monetary control variables.  
For example, Bordo and Rockoff (1996) examined the coupon yields of sovereign 
bonds and found that pre-World War I yields “differed substantially from country to 
country” and that “these differences were correlated with a country‟s long-term 
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commitment to the gold standard.” Their findings are consistent with the country studies 
of Martin-Acena (1993) and Sussman and Yafeh (2000), and have been confirmed in a 
larger sample of countries by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). 
On the other hand, Ferguson and Schularick (2006) have argued that membership 
in the British Empire, rather than adhering to the gold standard, was the key to reducing 
borrowing costs. Clemens and Williamson (2004) examined capital flows rather than 
bond yields and concluded that “gold was nowhere near the most important determinant 
of [capital] flows” and gold standard adherence paled in importance compared to the 
fundamental determinants of capital productivity. Flandreau and Zumer (2004) viewed 
the good-housekeeping hypothesis most pessimistically. They argued that international 
lenders focused almost exclusively on a country's ability to repay its foreign obligations 
and paid little attention to a country‟s monetary regime. Like previous authors, Flandreau 
and Zumer examined sovereign bond coupon yields but found that adhering to the gold 
standard had a negligible influence once they control for measures of sound public 
finances. 
Past tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis have reached mixed conclusions 
about the effect of the gold standard on borrowing costs due to differences in the sample 
of countries, model specification, and controls for non-gold risk factors. It is unlikely that 
a consensus will be reached with the existing data. Adjusting for risk is difficult when 
working with coupon yields rather than expected returns and no a priori criteria exist to 
disentangle competing specifications. 
I introduce a more direct test of the good-housekeeping hypothesis based on a 
new dataset. My data consist of the holding period returns of almost every stock and 
sovereign bond traded in London between 1870 and 1907. Using realized returns is novel 
for tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis, but my test methodology is routine in the 
finance literature when evaluating the hypothesis that the market demands a risk premium 
for holding assets with an observable trait.12 Data limitations have prevented past authors 
                                                 
12
 For example, Cornell and Green (1991) and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995) use realized return to 
measure the effect of bond ratings on the cost of capital; Fama and French (1995) use realized return to 
measure the effect of firm size on the cost of capital; and Lewellen (1999) uses realized return to measure 
the effect of book-to-market ratio on the cost of capital. 
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from employing return-based tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis. My dataset 
addresses this shortcoming.  
The dataset contains over 450,000 realized 28-day stock and sovereign bond 
returns collected from late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century financial publications. These data 
allow us to apply to this question the same empirical methods that researchers use to 
identify characteristics associated with risk and return in modern financial markets. My 
principal finding is that adherence to the gold standard did not reduce the cost of capital. 
Across a variety of specifications and samples, there is no link between a country being 
on the gold standard and the realized risk-adjusted return of its stock and sovereign debt. 
Conditional on business-cycle risk, the returns of assets issued by countries on and off 
gold are statistically indistinguishable from each another. An investor who selected assets 
based on gold standard adherence would not outperform an investor who selected assets 
at random. 
The next section (Section 2) discusses the empirical implications of the theory of 
the gold standard as a repeated game. Section 3 discusses the differences between tests 
based on coupon yield and expected return. Section 4 describes my data and empirical 
specifications. Section 5 reports my results. Section 6 summarizes my findings and 
concludes. 
3.2. The Gold Standard as a Repeated Game 
Bordo and Kydland‟s (1995) model postulates that the gold standard functioned as a 
credible commitment mechanism to overcome the time-inconsistency problem associated 
with international borrowing and lending. Countries and international lenders were 
engaged in a repeated game, and each period the government could raise funds with a 
mix of taxes and borrowing. A future government that chose the optimal mix of 
borrowing, taxation, and inflation to minimize the dead-weight loss would choose to tax 
assets that were inelastically supplied, and a welfare-maximizing government had the 
incentive to tax bondholders by inflating away the value of its outstanding debt. Investors 
recognized that future government policy was time-inconsistent and were unwilling to 
loan funds today without a credible guarantee that the future government would repay its 
debt in real terms.  
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To overcome this time-inconsistency problem, the bond market needed a 
mechanism to monitor the government‟s behavior. In this repeated game, a government 
could signal the international bond market that it was following sound fiscal and 
monetary policies. This amounted to a signal that the government was pursuing a policy 
mix that made it unlikely that it would be forced devalue the currency. Adherence to the 
gold standard could serve as such a commitment device. Thus the empirical implication 
of the good housekeeping hypothesis is that the capital market assigned a lower price, 
and demanded commensurately higher returns, to assets issued by countries that had 
abandoned gold.  
A problem with the good housekeeping explanation is that it required investors to 
act collectively. The gold standard‟s repeated game equilibrium relies upon the capital 
market collectively forgoing current profits to punish governments that deviated from 
sound financial policies. With many participants, this equilibrium required a collective 
action mechanism to prevent arbitrage-seeking investors from pushing the prices of 
otherwise identical on- and off-gold assets together. Large institutional investors, who 
were both sufficiently patient to punish the country and large enough to influence 
equilibrium prices, were good candidates to punish countries that abandoned gold. 
Historical candidates include the Council of Foreign Bondholders and large investment 
banks. The available archival evidence suggests that the Council was effective at 
organizing lenders when borrowers defaulted and renegotiating debt with the larger 
borrowers, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey (Mauro and Yafeh 2003). Whether such 
organizations were sufficiently large to affect equilibrium prices and punish cheaters is 
the empirical question that my paper addresses. 
3.3. The Good-Housekeeping Hypothesis, Coupon Yields, and Expected Returns 





, the current price of this bond is 
equal to the discounted stream of its cash flow 















The expected rate of return, tr , is the variable of interest. I would like to determine if the 
market demanded a higher expected rate of return for assets issued by countries that 
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violated the gold standard‟s rules, but the expected rate of return is unobservable. Its 
value depends on the market‟s expectation of future default embedded in the expected 











 sequence were known with certainty, 
the tr  sequence would be identified by the bond price under the assumption that tr  is 
constant for all t .  
The expected one-period gross return is   
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. Past coupon yield-based tests of the 
good housekeeping hypothesis have ignored the capital gain and evaluated the effect of 
adhering to the gold standard based on coupon yield alone. Coupon yield is correlated 
with expected return but it ignores capital gains and understates the true cost of capital 
when bonds are issued below par or contain sinking fund provisions, two features shared 
by the sovereign bonds of many 19
th
 century countries. 
The expected return is unobservable but it can be estimated from ex post realized 
returns. If financial markets are informationally efficient, the realized ex post return of an 
asset is the sum of its expected return and an independent mean zero random error 
(3)    1 1 1[ ]t t t tr E r      
Sample average returns converge to their expected value, and the average ex post holding 
period return is a good proxy for the actual unobservable expected return. 
3.4. Controlling for Risk with a Relative Pricing Model 
The good-housekeeping hypothesis predicts that, holding all else equal, assets of 
countries adhering to the gold standard trade at higher prices (lower expected return) than 
assets issued by non-gold standard countries. As I discussed above, this hypothesis is not 
easy to evaluate because expected returns are unobservable. Consequently, economists 
must use proxies such as coupon yield or realized holding period returns. Both expected 
returns and coupon yields of assets vary for reasons other than the credibility of the 
issuing government‟s monetary regime. Past tests of the good-housekeeping hypothesis 
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have relied on available bond yields and attempted to control for other factors by 
estimating regressions of the form: 
(4)   ,it i it i t it i i tYield GS Marketyield X          
where 
itYield  is a proxy for expected return such as coupon yield; i tGS  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the country is on gold; tMarketyield  captures common changes 
in all yields and is the yield on British consols or an average of the coupon yields on all 
bonds; and i tX  is a vector of country-specific fiscal and monetary variables intended to 
capture differences in economic fundamentals. The test of the good-housekeeping 
hypothesis amounts to testing that 0  . 
Authors have estimated different versions of equation (4) and reached 
contradictory conclusions depending upon their choice of sample countries, the use of 
pooled regressions or fixed effects, and fiscal and monetary variables. The disagreement 
hinges on what variables 19
th
 century investors used to evaluate the riskiness of a foreign 
loan. For example, the difference between the findings of Flandreau and Zumer (2004) 
and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) amounts to a disagreement about the variables that 19
th
 
century investors relied upon to measure risk. With no a priori criteria to sort competing 
models, I am pessimistic that this debate will be resolved with existing methods and data.  
Instead I suggest a different test based on realized holding period returns. Both the 
coupon yield and the realized return are correlated with unobservable expected return, but 
realized return is a better proxy for expected return. The realized return also allows us to 
control for confounding risk factors with the same methods that economists use to 
investigate the performance of contemporary bond portfolios.  
My method sidesteps the need to determine the variables that 19
th
 century 
investors used to determine an asset‟s risk. I use a relative pricing model that compares 
the returns of assets issued by countries on or off gold to a control group of British assets. 
In the contemporary asset-pricing literature, economists use these methods to compare 
the expected returns of assets selected by observable criteria such as fund manager skill 
(Jensen 1967), accounting fundamentals (Fama and French 1992), and past returns 
(Jegadeesh 1990). In a paper similar in spirit to mine, Cornell and Green (1991) use this 
methodology to control for confounding risk factors when comparing the performance of 
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bonds sorted by investment grade. In addition, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995) employ 
similar methods to examine the risk factors in modern bond index portfolios. 
3.5. Data and Empirical Specification 
According to the good-housekeeping hypothesis, international lenders punished countries 
that did not adhere to the gold standard by demanding a higher risk-adjusted return. I test 
this hypothesis by forming portfolios that mimic the returns an investor would have 
earned had he purchased a portfolio of assets issued by countries off gold and sold short a 
second portfolio comprised of assets issued by countries on gold. Put differently, I 
postulate that an investor wakes up every 28 days, sells a portfolio consisting of assets 
issued by countries adhering to the gold standard and buys a portfolio of assets issued by 
countries off gold. If the investor demanded a higher return for the assets of countries off 
gold, this strategy would generate risk-adjusted excess returns. My empirical test 
amounts to testing the hypothesis that an investor could use his knowledge that a given 
country adhered to the gold standard to beat the market on a risk-adjusted basis. 
The key words in the previous paragraph are “risk-adjusted”. I do not take a stand on the 
underlying determinants of risk and return. Instead I take returns as given and compare 
the return of a foreign asset to the return of a similarly risky portfolio of British assets. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it addresses the problem that countries did 
not leave gold randomly. If a country wanted to remain on gold but was forced off due to 
a negative business-cycle shock, I need to be careful not to conflate the business-cycle 
risks with the repeated game punishment. Business-cycle shocks may be correlated across 
countries and British investors may legitimately demand higher expected returns as 
compensation for holding greater business-cycle risk. In this case, the good-housekeeping 
hypothesis could be false but the return on the assets of countries that remained on the 
gold standard would be smaller due to smaller exposure to business-cycle risk. By 
comparing foreign returns to a control group of British assets, I disentangle the two 
effects and assess if investors demanded a premium due to gold standard adherence or 
business-cycle risk.  
I control for risk by estimating the regression: 
(5)  1 , 2 , 3 ,( ) ( ) ( ) ,it ft i con t ft SM t ft BM t ft tR R R R R R R R              
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where ,con tR  is the time t return on the British consol; ,SM tR  is the return on the value-
weighted portfolio of all British stocks at time t; and ,BM tR  is the value-weighted 
portfolio of British corporate bonds. I use the London banker‟s bill rate as a proxy for the 
risk-free rate f tR . i  is referred to as Jensen‟s alpha, after Jensen (1967) who suggested 
this framework for controlling for risk while evaluating the stock-picking abilities of 
mutual fund managers. i  measures the difference between portfolio i‟s return and the 
return of the portfolio of British assets with percentage weights 1  invested in the British 
Consol, 2  invested in the value-weighted British stock market portfolio, 3  invested in 
the value-weighted British bond market portfolio and 1 2 3(1 )      invested in the 
London banker‟s bill. i  therefore measures the difference between portfolio i‟s return 
and the return of the portfolio of British assets with the same business-cycle risk.  
If an investor actively managed the portfolio in equation (5), i  is a measure of 
the manager‟s ability to beat a portfolio of British assets with the same risk. The good-
housekeeping hypothesis implies that an investor could outperform British assets by 
selecting assets based on gold standard adherence. I test this hypothesis by forming an 
excess return portfolio that is long assets issued by countries off of gold and short assets 
issued by countries on gold. The resulting regression equation is given by: 
(6) , , 1 , 2 , 3 ,( ) ( ) ( ) ,off t on t i con t ft SM t ft BM t ft tR R R R R R R R            
    
where , ,k k off k on   
   . Thus a test of the good housekeeping hypothesis amounts to a test 
that i  is greater than zero.  
3.5.1. Data 
My tests require a monthly database of asset returns, and data limitations have prevented 
past researchers from applying such tests to the good-housekeeping hypothesis. I address 
this shortcoming by collecting a large sample of stocks, sovereign bonds, and colonial 
bonds trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1870 and 1907. These data consist 
of the bid and ask prices and dividend (coupon) payments for almost every foreign and 
British stock and foreign government bond regularly quoted on the exchange. The data 
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set includes 213 sovereign bonds issued by 36 countries, 110 colonial bonds issued by 12 
British colonies, and 1,808 stocks issued by firms in 44 countries. The prices were 
sampled every 28-days from the official quotation list published in the Money Market 
Review and the Economist. I use the price and dividend (coupon) data to compute a time 
series of realized holding period returns corrected for dividends, stock splits, and 
defaults.13 
3.5.2. Managed Portfolios 
I form portfolios that mimic the return an investor would have realized had he actively 
managed his portfolio by purchasing all assets issued by countries off gold and sold short 
all assets issued by countries on gold. When a country adopts the gold standard, I remove 
the country‟s assets from the off-gold portfolio and add it to the on-gold portfolio.  
I rely upon both contemporary and modern sources to date each country‟s gold-
standard adherence. A detailed list of sources and the dates that I used are in Appendix 2. 
In cases where it is difficult to determine de jure versus de facto adherence to the gold 
standard, I code the country as adhering to gold from the de jure convertibility date. In 
many cases, I am able to date gold standard adherence quite precisely, identifying the 
month and sometimes even the day, on which the currency became convertible into gold. 
In the cases where I can only identify the year in which a country adopted the gold 
standard, I date gold standard adherence from January 1 of that year.14 
3.5.3. Sample of Countries 
One potential explanation for the lack of consensus among previous tests of the good 
housekeeping hypothesis is that each study uses a different sample of countries. I have 
assets from a much larger sample of countries than previous authors. To evaluate the 
extent to which my results are driven by the countries selected, I evaluate the hypothesis 
with my full sample of countries and with subsamples corresponding as closely as 
possible to the countries used in Bordo and Rockoff (1996), Bordo and Schwartz (1996), 
                                                 
13
 I use the Council of Foreign Bondholders and default data provided by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) to 
date defaults on foreign debt. 
14
 In a previous draft of this paper, I assessed the robustness of our conclusions to alternative dating 
conventions. The results are very similar regardless of how we date gold standard adherence. These 
regression results are available upon request.  
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Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), and Flandreau and Zumer (2004). In all cases, I am able to 
mimic closely each of these samples. The countries contained in each of these 
subsamples are documented in Appendix 1. 
3.5.4. Country Weights 
When forming the portfolios, I must determine how much weight to give to the assets of 
each country. I formed value-weighted portfolios, which weight each asset by its market 
value. For example, if the market value of all Russian bonds is twice the value of Italian 
bonds, Russia receives twice the weight of Italy.15 
3.5.5. Comparing Stocks and Bonds 
Past tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis have focused exclusively on sovereign 
bonds. This is not surprising in light of the theoretical framework that postulates the gold 
standard as a repeated game between governments and the international capital market. 
Furthermore, coupon yield based tests cannot be applied to stocks that pay variable and 
unknown dividends. In contrast, my return-based tests can be applied to portfolios of 
stocks and bonds. I compute both managed sovereign bond portfolios and managed stock 
portfolios. Exchange rate volatility affects the private cost of capital in modern day 
developing markets (Solnik 1983). Adding stock portfolios allow us to assess the effects 
of adhering to the gold standard on the private cost of capital.  
3.6. Empirical Results 
Table 1 contains average returns and regression results for the value-weighted portfolios. 
Panel A reports the results for portfolios comprised of sovereign bonds. The strategy of 
buying assets issued by countries off gold and shorting assets issued by countries on gold 
did generate positive returns, but virtually all of these excess returns were due to 
differences in business-cycle risk. Controlling for differences in business-cycle risk, the 
return of off- and on-gold portfolios are indistinguishable from one another.  
Depending on the sample of countries, an investor who selected assets based on 
gold standard adherence would have earned an average 28-day excess return between 12 
                                                 
15
 To evaluate the robustness of the results, I also formed equally weighted portfolios. The results are very 
similar regardless of how we formed the portfolios. These regression results are available upon request. 
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and 19 basis points, amounting to an excess return of 1.6%-2.5% per year. This excess 
return is attributable to differences in business-cycle risk and does not reflect a market 
punishment for violating the rules of the gold standard. Once I control for risk by 
comparing the managed portfolios to similarly risky British assets, the excess returns 
vanish. Had an investor purchased a portfolio of British assets with the same business-
cycle risk, he would have earned the same return as an investor who selected assets based 
upon adherence to the gold standard. Regardless of sample countries, the alpha is 
economically small and statistically insignificant.  
With one exception, the betas in Panel A are always positive. The off-gold 
portfolios were more sensitive to movements in the return on the British consol, stock, 
and bond indices than the on-gold portfolios. Movements in these well-diversified British 
indexes largely reflect business-cycle shocks, suggesting that the higher unconditional 
returns associated with holding the off-gold country assets were compensation for 
bearing this business-cycle risk. During business-cycle contractions the assets of 
countries off gold tended to lose more value than the assets of countries on gold. British 
investors demanded a premium to hold this additional business-cycle risk, but it did not 
reflect a punishment for abandoning gold. A portfolio of British stocks and bonds with 
the same exposure to the British indexes generated statistically identical returns. Because 
these British assets were not being punished for violating the rules of the gold standard, I 
conclude that this excess return was compensation for business-cycle risk and the amount 
of compensation per unit of beta exposure was identical across assets regardless of 
whether the country adhered to gold or not. 
The results are similar in Panel B. Holding equity in a firm located in a country 
that did not adhere to gold did not yield a higher return than holding equity in a firm in a 
country on gold. Again, this result is robust to the sample of countries. 
The low R-squared statistics in Table 1 warrant a closer look. The R-squared 
statistics are small because the model does a poor job of explaining the time series 
variation of my managed portfolios returns. This outcome is exactly what one would 
expect if adherence to the gold standard had no effect on asset prices. The R-squared 
statistics may be small because variations in the British portfolios do a poor job of 
explaining variation in my managed portfolios or because gold standard adherence did 
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not matter and selecting assets based on gold is equivalent to selecting assets at random. 
If adhering to the gold standard had no effect on returns, selecting assets based on gold 
would be equivalent to assigning assets to portfolios at random. As the number of assets 
randomly assigned to each portfolio grows, the portfolio ‟s would converge to 
population betas and the  ‟s of the on gold portfolio minus off portfolio would converge 
to zero as well. 
I expect the R-squared statistics to be small when the British portfolios do a poor 
job of explaining non-diversifiable risk or when gold standard adherence does a poor job 
of explaining returns. I can disentangle these competing causes by estimating regression 
(5) with the on- and off-gold returns and comparing the results to the excess return 
regression in equation (6). Table 2 reports the individual regression results for the on- and 
off-gold value- and equally weighted portfolios. The model does a good job of pricing 
both portfolios. The adjusted R-squared statistics are respectable for monthly data – 
between 15%-20%. In addition, the estimated coefficients in the separate on- and off-gold 
portfolios tend to be quite close to one another. Thus, when one computes excess returns 
by taking the difference between the off- and on-gold portfolios, the estimated 
coefficients and R-squared statistics are close to zero – exactly what one would expect if 
the gold standard did not matter. 
In sum, a 19
th
 century investor did not demand a risk premium for holding 
countries assets issued by countries off of gold. Had an investor tried to beat the market 
by betting that off-gold countries would outperform on-gold countries, he would have 
been unable to do so. 
3.6.1. Robustness Check: Random Portfolios 
Portfolios selected with knowledge of adherence to the gold standard did not outperform 
portfolios of British assets with the same exposure to business-cycle risk. I base this 
conclusion on the small i  values in Table 1. A test that i  is equal to zero is a joint test 
of the good housekeeping hypothesis and the risk and return model implied by the excess 
return regression. To be certain that the small alphas are not due to model 
misspecification, I compare the alphas of the managed portfolios to the alpha an investor 
would have obtained if he had selected assets purely at random. 
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For each type of asset and country sample in Table 1, I compute excess return 
portfolios by randomly assigning the same sample of assets to one of two portfolios. 
Assets are assigned in the same proportion as the proportion of gold standard adherence. I 
compute 1000 random portfolios and report the proportion of times the portfolio selected 
using the gold standard criterion earns a higher excess return than a portfolio selected at 
random. 
For example, in the value-weighted Bordo-Rockoff sample of sovereign bonds, 
56% of the observed returns were associated with bonds on gold. I compute a random 
excess return portfolio with the same assets by randomly buying 44% of the bonds each 
period and shorting the other 56%. I compute the random portfolio‟s i  and repeat the 
random selection 1000 times. The result is 1000 random alphas. 
If gold standard adherence didn‟t matter, I would expect portfolios selected based 
on gold standard adherence to do no better than portfolios selected at random. The 
simulation, which sorts the assets randomly to one or the other portfolio, directly 
addresses the question of whether sorting on the gold standard does better than sorting 
randomly. Table 1 reports the success rate – the proportion of times the managed 
portfolios beat portfolios formed at random. The results are consistent with the 
conclusion that gold standard adherence did not matter. On average, portfolios selected 
by gold standard adherence do no better than portfolios selected at random. 
3.6.2. Further Robustness Checks: Perfect-Foresight and Cheater Portfolios 
I also assess the robustness of the results to both anticipation effects and allowing 
investors to punish countries that defaulted. The managed portfolios may reflect the 
market‟s anticipation that countries within each portfolio would resume or suspend the 
gold standard. Thus the return of the off-gold portfolio minus the on-gold portfolio will 
be biased upwards if my dating procedure lags market expectations and the null 
hypothesis is true. In addition, I coded a country as adhering to the gold standard if they 
were on gold in the preceding tests. However, some countries were on the gold standard, 
suspended convertibility for a brief period, and returned to gold at a lower par (Bordo and 
Kydland 1995). If the capital market considered countries on gold at a lower par to be 
cheating, my managed portfolios based on gold convertibility miscodes some countries. 
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To check the robustness of the results to anticipation affects, I formed both value- 
and equally weighted portfolios derived in the same manner as above, with the exception 
that changes in gold standard status are reflected one year before the actual change in 
status occurs. I thus assume that the Victorian investor perfectly anticipates whether a 
country joins or suspends the gold standard one year in advance. I omit these regression 
results for brevity, but they are very similar to those presented in Table 1 and are 
available upon request. Managed portfolios that select assets based on gold standard 
adherence do not generate excess returns even when the portfolio manager perfectly 
anticipates a change in gold standard status. 
To assess the effect of temporarily suspending convertibility, I recode the 
countries as adhering to gold if it is currently on gold at its original par. If a country is on 
gold, suspends convertibility, and returns to gold at a lower par, I recode this country as a 
“cheater”. I consider this country as off gold for the period that it is off gold or on gold at 
a lower par. Countries that suspend convertibility are thus considered off gold until they 
return at the original par. With this new coding, I recomputed my results, which are 
omitted for brevity but are available upon request. The results are robust to this new 
coding scheme. The off-gold minus the on-gold managed portfolios are statistically 
indistinguishable from British assets even when I use memory of past cheating to sort 
countries. 
3.7. Conclusion 
The good-housekeeping hypothesis predicts that the international capital market 
rewarded countries that adhered to the classical gold standard with a favorable cost of 
capital. Due to data limitations, past tests of this hypothesis did not measure actual 
returns. I address this shortcoming by introducing a new data set consisting of the 28-day 
holding period returns of sovereign bonds, colonial bonds, and stocks trading in London 
between 1870 and 1907. The new sample allows us to measure actual holding period 
returns and apply modern asset-pricing models to evaluate the testable implications of the 
good housekeeping hypothesis. 
I find no evidence in favor of the good-housekeeping hypothesis. The returns on 
assets issued by countries on and off gold are statistically identical to each other. 
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Portfolios formed by shorting assets issued by countries on gold and purchasing assets 
issued by countries off of gold do not outperform similarly risky British assets. 
Furthermore, portfolios selected with knowledge about gold standard adherence do not 
outperform portfolios selected completely at random.  
These results are very robust. I find no evidence of a gold-standard effect across 
asset classes or country samples. These results persist even when I form portfolios with 
perfect foresight of gold standard regime change or assume the international capital 
market punished past departures from the rules of the game. Overall, these new data and 
tests suggest that countries that adopted the gold standard were not rewarded with a low 
cost of capital. Thus the gold standard did not necessarily serve as a transparent signal of 
prudent financial policies.  
More broadly, these results shed new light on the perceived benefits of fixed 
exchange rate regimes. A widely cited benefit of the gold standard is that it reduced 




Notes: The regression is equation (6) in the text. The success rate measures the 
proportion of times that the gold portfolio earns a higher excess return than a randomly 
selected portfolio. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *** (**) (*) indicates 







Table 3-1: 28-Day Excess Return Regressions: Off-Gold Portfolio – On Gold Portfolio (cont.) 
Dependent Variable: , ,O f f t O n tR R  
 
Panel A: Value-Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios 
 Alquist-Chabot Bordo-Rockoff Bordo-Schwartz Obstfeld-Taylor Flandreau-Zumer 




































      










2R  0.062 0.045 0.028 0.070 0.047 
Success Rate 24.1% 68.9% 48.4% 39.1% 78.7% 







Table 3-1: 28-Day Excess Return Regressions: Off-Gold Portfolio – On Gold Portfolio (concl.) 
Dependent Variable: , ,O f f t O n tR R  
 
Panel B: Value-Weighted Stock Portfolios 
 Alquist-Chabot Bordo-Rockoff Bordo-Schwartz Obstfeld-Taylor Flandreau-Zumer 
Average Return 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0013 
ˆ
































      










2R  0.003 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.005 





Table 3-2: 28-Day Excess Return Regressions: On- and Off-Gold Portfolios 
Dependent Variable: 
,i t ftR R  
     
Panel A: Sovereign Bonds 
 Value-Weighted Equally Weighted 
 On-Gold Off-Gold On-Gold Off-Gold 






























     








2R  0.118 0.203 0.171 0.177 
     
Panel B: Foreign Stocks 
 Value-Weighted Equally Weighted 
 On-Gold Off-Gold On-Gold Off-Gold 
Average Return 0.0042 0.0047 0.0055 0.0059 
ˆ


























     








2R  0.222 0.224 0.148 0.166 




Appendix 3-1: Sample of Countries 
Sovereign Bond Data 
The countries included in my dataset on sovereign bonds are: Argentina; Australia; 
Austria-Hungary; Belgium; Brazil; British Guiana; Bulgaria; Canada; Ceylon; Chile; 
China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Denmark; Ecuador; Egypt; France; Germany; Greece; 
Guatemala; Hawaii; Honduras; Hong Kong; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Liberia; Mauritius; 
Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Norway; Orange Free State; Paraguay; 
Peru; Portugal; Russia; Saint Lucia; Santo Domingo; South Africa; Spain; Straits 
Settlements; Sweden; Trinidad; Turkey; United States; Uruguay; and Venezuela. 
The British colonies comprise a subset of the countries in my sample. They are: 
Australia; British Guiana; Canada; Ceylon; Hong Kong; Jamaica; Mauritius; New 
Zealand; Saint Lucia; South Africa; and Trinidad. 
Stock Data 
In addition to the countries listed above, the countries included in my dataset on stocks 
are: Cuba; El Salvador; Dutch East Indies; India; Malta; Morocco; Persia; Philippines; 
Romania; and Uganda. 
Subsamples 
I formed subsamples of countries based upon previous work on the gold standard. I am 
able to mimic closely each of the samples of countries listed below. 
Bordo and Rockoff (1996) : Argentina; Australia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; Italy; Portugal; 
Spain; and United States. 
Bordo and Schwartz (1996) : Argentina; Australia; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; 
Chile; Denmark; Finland; Greece; Italy; Japan; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Sweden; 
and Switzerland. The four core countries are France, Germany, the UK, and the United 
States. I exclude Finland and Switzerland due to lack of data. 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2003): Argentina; Australia; Austria-Hungary; Brazil; 
Canada; Chile; Egypt; Greece; India; Italy; Japan; Mexico; New Zealand; Norway; 




Flandreau and Zumer (2004): Argentina; Austria-Hungary; Belgium; Brazil; Denmark; 
France; Germany; Greece; Italy; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; 
Switzerland; and Russia. I exclude Switzerland due to lack of data. 
I adopt the definition of cheater from Bordo and Schwartz‟s Table 1 (Bordo and Schwartz 
1996). I code a country as a cheater if it suspended gold convertibility because of war, lax 
fiscal policy, a financial crisis, failed convertibility, or some combination of the four. The 





Appendix 3-2: Gold Standard Adherence 
Argentina: January 3, 1867-May 1876: Dated from establishment of Office of Exchange 
to control amount of paper pesos outstanding. This event did not result in a change of 
parity. July 1883-December 1884: de facto suspension of convertibility by banks. This 
event did not result in a change of parity. October 31, 1899: Law establishing external 
convertibility. Source: della Paolera and Taylor (2001), pp. 25, 41, 47. 
Australia: Adopted the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1870. Source: 
Meissner (2005). 
Austria-Hungary: August 2, 1892. Source: Helfferich (1927), pp. 200. 
Belgium: November 5, 1878. Source: Helfferich (1927), pp. 180. 
Brazil: October 1888-October 1890. This event did not result in a change of parity. 
December 31, 1906: Conversion Office opened. Sources: Martin-Acena (2000), 2000, pp 
155; and Subercaseaux (1931). 
British Guiana: Adopted the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1870. 
Source: Officer (2001). 
Bulgaria: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. Source: 
Meissner (2005). 
Canada: Adopted the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1870. 
Newfoundland did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold until 1895, 
according to Officer (2001). I date the bonds from Newfoundland from January 1, 1895. 
Sources: Meissner (2005). 
Ceylon: 1898. I date Ceylon as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1898. 
Source: Officer (2001). 
Chile: Law passed February 11, 1895 providing for conversion from June 1, 1895. 
Suspended convertibility July 31, 1898. This event resulted in a change of parity. Source: 
Kemmerer (1926).  
China: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. Source: 
Bloomfield (1959). 
Colombia: From 1903, Colombia has fixed gold parities, but it did not adopt a complete 




as not adopting the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. Source: Martin-
Acena (2000), pp. 237. 
Costa Rica: Law passed in October 1896, but currency was not convertible into gold until 
July 15, 1900. I date it from November 1896. Source: Young (1925), pp. 193-96. 
Cuba: 1898. I date Cuba as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1898. Source: 
Officer (2001). 
Denmark: Agreement reached December 18, 1872. Formed monetary union with Sweden 
in May 1873. I date it from June 1873. Sources: Helfferich (1927), pp. 175; and Jonung 
(1984), pp. 367. 
Dutch East Indies: 1877. I date the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) as adhering to the gold 
standard from January 1, 1877. Meissner (2005). 
Ecuador: 1900. I date Ecuador as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1900. 
Source: Meissner (2005).  
Egypt: 1885. I date Egypt as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1885. Source: 
Officer (2001). 
El Salvador: 1892. I date El Salvador as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 
1892. Meissner (2005). 
France: November 5, 1878. Source: Helfferich (1927), pp. 180 
Germany: December 4, 1871. Source: Helfferich (1927), pp. 156-7. 
Greece: January 1885-September 1885. This event did not result in a change of parity. 
Greece did not join the gold standard again until March 1910. Sources: Bordo and 
Schwartz (1999), pp. 251; and Lazaretou (2005). 
Guatemala: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. 
Source: Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp 112. 
Hawaii: Adopted the Gold Law of 1884, which made the gold coins of the United States 
legal tender. I date Hawaii as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1884. Source: 
Tate (1965), pp. 69.    
Honduras: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. 




Hong Kong: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. 
Source: Tom (1989). 
India: 1898. I date India as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1898. Source: 
Officer (2001). 
Italy: Law establishing convertibility April 12, 1884 passed March 1, 1883. Affidavit 
introduced on second semester coupon payments in July 1893. Required Italians to swear 
rendita coupon payments received abroad did not belong to Italian citizens. Introduced 
incentives for lenders to redeem in Milan. This event resulted in a change in parity. 
Sources: Helfferich (1927), pp. 175; and Fratianni and Spinelli (1984), pp. 415. 
Jamaica: Adopted the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1870. Source: 
Officer (2001). 
Japan: Law passed March 29, 1897 providing for conversion between October 1, 1897-
July 31, 1898. Sources: Helfferich (1927), pp. 201; and Laughlin (1900). 
Liberia: Pegged to US dollar at the exchange rate L$1 = US$1. I code it the same as the 
US. Source: http://users.erols.com/kurrency/africa.htm 
Malta : Adopted the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1870. Source: Officer 
(2001). 
Mauritius : 1898. I date Mauritius as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1898. 
Source: Officer (2001). 
Mexico: Law passed December 9, 1904. Decree enforced March 25, 1905. Source: 
Helfferich (1927), pp. 204. 
Morocco: I find no evidence that Morocco adhered to the gold standard during the sample 
period. I code it as not adhering to the gold standard. 
Nicaragua: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. 
Sources: Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp 115; and Young (1925), pp. 119-30; Appendix E. 
Netherlands: June 6, 1875. Source: Helfferich (1927), pp. 176. 





Norway: Agreement reached December 18, 1872. Norway formed a monetary union with 
Denmark and Sweden in October 1875. Sources: Helfferich (1927), pp. 175; and Jonung 
(1984), pp. 367. 
Orange Free State: 1870-December 14, 1899. December 15, 1899-March 14, 1900: Gold 
standard suspended. March 15, 1900-1910: Gold standard re-established. Source: 
http://users.erols.com/kurrency/africa.htm 
Paraguay: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. Source: 
Bulmer-Thomas (2003), pp 114. 
Persia: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. Source: 
Meissner (2005). 
Peru: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. Source: 
Meissner (2005). 
Philippines: 1903. I code the Philippines as adhering to gold from January 1, 1903. 
Source: Meissner (2005). 
Portugal: 1854-May 1891. This event resulted in a change in parity. Source: Reis (2000), 
pp 94. 
Romania: 1890. I code Romania as adhering to gold from January 1, 1890. Source: 
Meissner (2005). 
Russia: February 1897. Source: Anonymous (1897). 
St. Lucia: Adopted the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1870. Source: 
Officer (2001). 
Santo Domingo: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. 
Sources: Laughlin (1894); and Meissner (2005). 
South Africa: Adopted the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1870. Source: 
Officer (2001). 
Spain: Suspended summer 1883 because of decline in foreign investment after January 
1882 stock market crash. The precise date is vague, and I date it from the end of June 




Straits Settlements: 1903. I date the Straits Settlements as adhering to the gold standard 
from January 1, 1903. Source: Meissner (2005). 
Sweden: Agreement reached December 18, 1872. Formed monetary union with Denmark 
in May 1873. Sources: Helfferich (1927), pp. 175; and Jonung (1984), pp. 367. 
Trinidad: Adopted the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1870. Source: 
Officer (2001). 
Turkey: 1881. I date Turkey as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1881 
Sources: Pamuk (2000), pp. 218. 
Uganda: 1898. I date Uganda as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1898. 
Source: Officer (2001). 
Uruguay: 1885. I date Uruguay as adhering to the gold standard from January 1, 1885. 
Source: Meissner (2005). 
United States: January 1, 1879. Source: Officer (2001). 
Venezuela: Did not adopt the free convertibility of currency into gold before 1914. 
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How Important Is Liquidity Risk for Sovereign Bond Risk Premium? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Liquidity risk – the risk that the price of a security will decline when the market as a 
whole becomes illiquid – is important for understanding the behavior of sovereign bond 
prices. “Liquidity” describes the ease with which one can trade large quantities of a 
security quickly, at low cost, and without altering the security‟s price. Liquidity risk and 
the associated premium that a risk-averse investor demands for bearing such risk thus 
reflect the sensitivity of the sovereign bond‟s price to unexpected changes in an aggregate 
measure of the ease with which one can trade securities. For example, during periods of 
financial turbulence, there is often a “flight to liquidity,” a phenomenon that has become 
increasingly important in international financial markets. In a flight to liquidity, market 
participants shift their asset holdings to more liquid sovereign bonds rather than less 
liquid ones. A recent example of a flight to quality was the sharp increase in the price of 
US Treasuries relative to less-liquid debt instruments in response to Russian default in 
August 1998. 
 To the extent that sovereign bonds are differentially exposed to the risk associated 
with credit crunches and the attendant decline in market liquidity, asset-pricing theory 
predicts that risk-averse investors will demand a liquidity premium for bearing such risk. 
Sovereign bonds that are more exposed to liquidity risk will trade at a discount relative to 
bonds that are less exposed to such risk. The available evidence for the US suggests that 
there is a liquidity premium embedded in the price of US government bonds, suggesting 
that liquidity risk is an important determinant of sovereign bond risk premia (Amihud and 
Mendelson 1991; Krishnamurthy 2002; and Longstaff 2004). Liquidity risk is also a good 




 The rapid growth of the international market for sovereign debt since 1980 has 
made studying the influence of liquidity risk on sovereign bond risk premia salient. By 
“sovereign bonds,” I mean bonds issued internationally by governments or government 
agencies, whose payments are guaranteed by these governments. Most sovereign bonds 
are issued in foreign currency and only a small number of developed countries in North 
America and Western Europe are able to issue debt in their own currency. As developed 
countries have run large and persistent deficits since the 1970s, these countries have 
adopted more liberal policies concerning the issuance and trading of their sovereign debt, 
which in turn facilitated the dramatic increase in the size of the international debt market. 
Similarly, the composition of capital flows to developing countries has shifted from 
syndicated bank loans – the primary form of sovereign lending during the 1970s 
(Folkerts-Landau 1985) – to debt instruments. Between 1990 and 2007, capital flows to 
developing countries in the form bonds have increased at an average annual rate of 20.0% 
per year whereas equities and syndicated bank loans have increased at average annual 
rates of 31.9% and 13.6% per year (Table 1). The data in Table 1 do not discriminate 
between capital flows to private borrowers and sovereign borrowers, but independent 
evidence shows that most of these flows of bond finance to developing countries consist 
of sovereign bonds as these borrowers have switched away from syndicated bank loans 
(Eichengreen and Mody 2000). 
 This evidence underscores that the volume of outstanding sovereign debt has 
increased and highlights the pressing need for understanding how this debt is valued. As 
a benchmark for the private cost of capital, the price of sovereign debt is a key price for 
countries that use the international bond market to meet their external financing needs. 
Understanding the determinants of this price is thus a first-order concern. 
 It may seem surprising that modern data are inadequate to understand the role of 
liquidity risk as a determinant of sovereign bond prices, but there were no centralized 
markets for trading such debt until recently. Until the late 1970s, interest rate and foreign 
exchange controls in the major financial centers prevented the development of an 
international sovereign debt market. Since then, active secondary markets in New York, 
London, and Tokyo for foreign debt have emerged, but observable bid-ask spreads, a key 




widely available. Sovereign bonds are primarily sold “over the counter,” which means 
that prices are quoted privately to the customer by the salesman rather than openly quoted 
on the stock market. Indeed, a 1999 Bank for International Settlements study of 
government bond market liquidity in the G10 countries found it difficult to compare bid-
ask spreads among these countries because market data on bid-ask spreads were 
unavailable and had to be estimated by the countries‟ central banks (Bank for 
International Settlements 1999). This lack of data from the contemporary period makes 
studying the influence of liquidity risk on sovereign borrowing costs problematic. 
 This paper overcomes this difficulty by studying the sovereign debt market in 
London prior to World War One. This market is ideally suited to shedding light on the 
relationship between liquidity risk and the price of sovereign. In fact, there are strong 
similarities between that era of extensive financial integration and the current one. 
Capital flows during that era were as large as, or larger than, they are today, suggesting 
that capital mobility in the current period is comparable to the levels experienced during 
the late 19
th
 century (Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh 2002; and Taylor 2002). Moreover, 
sovereign borrowers during that period relied exclusively on bonds as their principal 
means for obtaining external finance. To the extent that today‟s international bond market 
continues to be important for sovereign borrowers to obtain external finance, 
characterizing the relationship between sovereign bond risk premia and liquidity risk 
prior to World War One provides us with instructive lessons for understanding this 
relationship today. 
 The London sovereign debt market possesses unique features that make it an 
excellent laboratory for studying effect of liquidity risk on sovereign bond risk premia. 
Observable bid-ask spreads denominated in a common currency for a heterogeneous set 
of sovereign borrowers are available from 1870 until 1914. There is substantial time-
series variation in the behavior of sovereign bond risk premia and market liquidity during 
this period, which encompasses the peaks and troughs of several international business 
cycles, including the depression that began in 1873; financial crises that affected the 
major sovereign borrowers; and at least three lending booms in the London sovereign 
debt market – one in the mid-1870s, one in the mid- to late 1880s, and one in the decade 




several business cycles but also a number of complete lending cycles and market 
liquidity, making this environment a natural setting in which to study the influence of 
liquidity risk on sovereign bond risk premia. 
 The results are highly informative. There is strong evidence that sovereign bond 
risk premia reflect exposure to liquidity risk in addition to business-cycle risk and 
interest-rate risk. The data reject the null hypothesis that excluding unanticipated changes 
in liquidity improves the statistical fit of the model, suggesting an independent role for 
liquidity risk as a driver of the price of risk. The contribution of liquidity risk-to-risk 
premium associated with sovereign borrowing is about the same value in absolute 
magnitude as the contribution of business-cycle risk and it is larger than the contribution 
of interest-rate risk. These results therefore indicate that the liquidity premium is one of 
the key drivers of the price of sovereign debt, in addition to the business-cycle risk and 
interest-rate risk. 
 The principal lesson for sovereign borrowers is that lenders value liquidity in 
sovereign bond issues and that the liquidity premium is quantitatively important. 
Sovereign borrowers should find methods of promoting the liquidity of their bond issues 
by, for example, bundling together a series of small issues into a single large issue. 
Although such a recommendation seems obvious, the evidence presented in this paper 
establishes the quantitative importance of liquidity risk for sovereign borrowing costs. 
 Section 2 reviews the theoretical relationship between unexpected changes in 
liquidity risk and equity returns and makes the case for postulating a similar relationship 
in the sovereign bond market. Section 3 discusses the features of the 19
th
 century 
sovereign debt that make it a natural laboratory for studying the relationship between 
sovereign bond risk premia and liquidity risk. Section 4 describes the data, the 
construction of the market liquidity measure, and some of the characteristics of this 
liquidity measure. Section 5 presents the asset-pricing methods for studying sovereign 
bond risk premia. Section 6 reports the evidence documenting the liquidity premium 





4.2. Sovereign Bond Risk Premia and Liquidity Risk 
Although economists have studied the relationship between risk premia and changes in 
market liquidity in the equity market, they have paid little attention to this relationship in 
the sovereign debt market. The evidence from the equity market suggests that stocks are 
differentially exposed to liquidity risk and that liquidity risk is a priced state variable 
(see, for example, Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Acharya and Pedersen 2005; and Liu 
2006). 
 The theoretical logic of this relationship is well-established. A security‟s risk 
premium is a linear function of its sensitivity to unexpected changes in pervasive risks 
(Merton 1973; Ross 1976; and Breeden 1979). Models that explicitly incorporate 
liquidity as a pervasive risk are consistent with such reasoning (Acharya and Pedersen 
2005). In these models, unanticipated changes in pervasive liquidity covary positively 
with the business cycle. Risk-averse investors therefore demand a premium for holding 
securities whose payoffs also covary positively with these changes in pervasive liquidity. 
Thus a security‟s return is linearly related to its sensitivity to changes in unexpected 
changes in pervasive liquidity in the same way that the consumption-based capital asset 
pricing model predicts a security‟s return is linearly related to its sensitivity to 
unexpected changes in macroeconomic state variables. 
The available evidence from the US Treasury market suggests a role for liquidity 
in the pricing of this debt. More liquid US Treasury issues trade at a premium compared 
to less liquid issues (Amihud and Mendelson 1991). On-the-run, or more recently issued, 
30-year US Treasury bonds trade at a discount relative to off-the-run, or less recently 
issued, 30-year US Treasury bonds (Krishnamurthy 2002). In addition, there is indirect 
evidence of the influence of liquidity on sovereign bond prices in international financial 
markets. During periods of financial turbulence, US Treasuries act as a safe haven for 
international investors. Financial capital exhibits a flight to liquidity in conjunction with 
financial crises and the attendant decreases in liquidity (Longstaff 2004). A recent 
example of such a flight to liquidity with broad repercussions for international financial 





 This evidence is important because it suggests a role for liquidity in pricing 
sovereign debt that is traded internationally, although little attention has been paid to this 
relationship. Several papers study sovereign bond risk premia in the debt market for 
developed countries (Ilmanen 1995; and Barr and Priestley 2004), developing countries 
(Edwards 1986; and Durbin and Ng 2005), or the risk premia associated with syndicated 
bank loans to developing countries (Boehmer and Megginson 1990; and Eichengreen and 
Mody 2000). The papers that focus on the sovereign borrowing costs during earlier 
periods of extensive financial integration either study the sovereign lending boom that 
began in the 1920s and ended with the onset of the Great Depression (Eichengreen and 
Portes 1986; and Stone 1991), or they examine different questions (Mauro, Sussman, and 
Yafeh 2002). None of these papers studies liquidity risk as a determinant of sovereign 
borrowing costs. 
 This paper studies the influence of liquidity risk on sovereign bond risk premia. It 
shows that liquidity risk has an economically important and statistically significant effect 
on the magnitude of the sovereign bond risk premium and suggests an independent role 
for unexpected changes in liquidity as a pervasive risk in determining sovereign bond risk 
premia, above and beyond business-cycle risk and interest-rate risk. 
 These findings are important for two reasons. First, since the price of sovereign 
debt serves as a benchmark for the cost of private-sector debt in the economy, modeling 
the influence of liquidity risk on the cost of sovereign debt helps us to understand better 
the determinants of the price of corporate debt in these borrower countries, particularly 
those that rely on the international capital market to meet their financing needs (Dittmar 
and Yuan forthcoming). Second, to the extent that decreases in market liquidity are 
associated with financial distress and sovereign defaults, such evidence sheds light on the 
channels through which these episodes affect borrowing costs. In particular, the evidence 
presented in this paper isolates the effect of unexpected changes in liquidity on sovereign 
borrowing costs, in addition to other pervasive risks. 
4.3. The 19
th
 Century London Sovereign Debt Market as a Natural Experiment 
The quality of the data set that this paper uses to study sovereign bond risk premia is hard 




bond prices available on the London Stock Exchange during the late 19
th
 century. In light 
of London‟s importance as a financial center during this period, these data represent a 
substantial fraction of the universe of bonds traded in the world during that time. This 
time series is long enough to conduct asset-pricing tests and the cross-section of bonds 
diverse enough to guarantee dispersion in the factor sensitivities across sovereign 
portfolios. Moreover, since the bonds were traded in a single, centralized market, these 
data enable me to identify, in the econometric sense, the relationship between sovereign 
bond risk premia and liquidity risk without having to control for different levels of 
market liquidity in geographically separated markets. These features of the data make the 
London Stock Exchange during that period a natural environment for characterizing the 
effect liquidity risk on sovereign borrowing costs. 
 This paper uses these data not out of antiquarian interest but because conducting 
such a study with contemporary data is problematic. Although countries today 
increasingly rely on the international bond market for external finance, this development 
is recent. Prior to the 1970s, the last time that sovereigns relied on the international bond 
market was the 1920s and, prior to that, the period before World War One. Between 1930 
and 1970, interest rate and foreign exchange controls sharply curtailed private 
international capital flows in general and cross-border bond investment in particular. 
Starting in the 1970s, the major financial centers relaxed these restrictions on 
international capital flows, facilitating the gradual expansion of the international bond 
market. Reliable sovereign prices, and bid-ask spreads in particular, are at best available 
from the late 1970s and, in practice, may be only available from the 1980s or even the 
1990s: Although the secondary market for the sovereign debt of developing countries has 
existed since the mid-1980s, it was an over the counter market in which each transaction 
was negotiated in a complex and time-consuming process. This market structure ensured 
that trading was dominated by a small set of firms in New York and London that matched 
buyers and sellers as well as trading for their own accounts. Because of this market‟s lack 
of transparency, the data prior to the 1990s are considered unreliable (Stone 1991). There 
are thus at most 18 years of price data available for developing countries and, in practice, 
there are typically fewer data points available. Bid-ask spreads or other measures of 




even with monthly data and under the most optimistic assumptions about data 
availability, these time series are too short to conduct asset-pricing tests with statistical 
power. We are in the remarkable position that data from the past are more complete in 
this particular dimension than contemporary data and enable us to address a question of 
current interest. 
 This paper‟s contribution is to use the unique economic environment of the 
London Stock Exchange as a laboratory to study the relationship between sovereign bond 
risk premia and liquidity risk. These price data provide us with an opportunity to learn 
more about the pervasive risks that affect the price of sovereign debt. As this paper 
documents, liquidity risk has an economically important and statistically significant 
effect on the price of sovereign debt.  
4.4. Data 
The data consist of the closing bid and ask prices as well as the coupon payments for all 
of the sovereign bonds traded on the London Stock Exchange between 1866 and 1907. 
This data set contains 213 bonds issued by 38 countries and 110 bonds issued by 11 
British colonies. The prices were sampled every 28 days from the official quotation list 
published in the Money Market Review between 1866 and 1907, when such detailed price 
quotations ceased to be available, and were supplemented with quotations from the Times 
of London and the Economist. These price series comprise the entire universe of 
sovereign bonds traded on the London Stock Exchange during that time. The number of 
sovereign bond prices quoted in the Money Market Review does not exceed four until late 
1870 and there are fewer than 10 sovereign bond price quotations until December 1870. 
Appendix 1 contains further details on the construction of the data set and a complete list 
of all of the countries represented in it. 
4.4.1. Holding-Period Returns 
Because yields from the London bond market are unavailable during this period, I 
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where 1tP  denotes the price of the sovereign bond at 1t  ; and 1tC   denotes the coupon 
payment, if any, at 1t  . Expected returns are not observable, but they can be estimated 
using ex post realized returns. If expectations are rational, then the realized ex post return 
of the bond is its expected return plus an independent mean zero random error term 
1 1 1[ ]t t t tr E r     . The sample average of holding-period returns thus converges to its 
expected value and average ex post holding-period returns are a good proxy for 
unobservable expected returns. 
 When the sovereign bond is actively traded in a secondary market, holding-period 
returns take account of the changing opportunity cost of borrowing and lending over 
time, thereby capturing the time-series variation in sovereign borrowing costs. These 
price changes can reflect two types of risk. The first type of risk is devaluation risk, 
which captures debtor countries‟ incentive to inflate away the value of their debts that is 
denominated in domestic currency. This risk exists in economic environments with 
floating exchange rates. The second type of risk is the risk associated with outright 
default or repudiation of the foreign debt. Most of the sovereign bonds traded in London 
were denominated in pounds, although there were important exceptions to this rule. Some 
countries in Western Europe and North America such as France, Germany, and the US 
issued debt denominated in their domestic currencies. To the extent that there was 
devaluation risk embedded in these bond prices, the gold standard, the fixed exchange 
rate regime that prevailed during the late 19
th
 century, ensured that these two risks were, 
for practical purposes, perfectly correlated: The countries that defaulted on their debts did 
so in conjunction with suspending the gold standard, which entailed devaluing the 
domestic currency (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). Empirically, every sovereign borrower 
who defaulted also left gold. In this economic environment, these two types of risk are 
not separately identifiable, but the external constraints that the gold standard imposed on 
sovereign borrowers and the empirical features of default in the 19
th
 century suggest that 




 Thus changes in the bond‟s price, adjusted for coupon payments and the 
appropriate risk-free interest rate, are good indicators of changing expectations about the 
price of a sovereign bond. Alternative measures of borrowing costs such as the coupon 
yield do not capture the time-series variation in capital gains and losses associated with 
price changes and ignore information about changes in market expectations, as reflected 
in such price changes. Moreover, empirical asset-pricing methods can decompose 
holding-period returns into the components due to pervasive risks and assess each 
component‟s importance for pricing sovereign debt. 
4.4.2. Market Liquidity 
Studies have adopted alternative measures of liquidity depending on data availability 
(see, for example, Pástor and Shambaugh 2003; and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
2007), and there is no strong consensus which empirical measure of liquidity is best 
(Korajczyk and Sadka 2008). This study constructs a measure of liquidity based on the 
bid-ask spread – that is, the difference between the prices at which a trader is able to buy 
and sell a security relative to the midpoint of these two prices. 
 The economic logic of using the bid-ask spread as a measure of the liquidity relies 
upon models in which market makers set these spreads to protect themselves against 
trading with informed traders. The bid-ask spread for an individual security emerges as 
the market maker‟s compensation for his losses from trading with these informed traders 
(Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; and Kyle 1985). It is indicative of 
the amount of asymmetric information associated with each security and the market-wide 
liquidity index based on each individual security‟s spread is intended to measure the 
aggregate amount of asymmetric information in the market. During periods of market 
turbulence, this index should widen, indicating greater asymmetric information in the 
market (see, for example, Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam 2005). 
 To construct a measure of market liquidity in the London sovereign bond market, 
I use the bid-ask spreads from the bonds trading at a given point in time. The bid and ask 




January 1871 to December 1907, yielding 482 time-series observations.
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 The bid-ask 
spread for bond i  is: 















i tP  is the ask price of the bond; and 
b
i tP  is the bid price of the bond. The equally 
weighted bid-ask spread index for the entire market is an index of market liquidity for the 
entire market: 
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where tN  is the number of bonds trading in period t . With the market values of each 
bond in a particular period, one could construct a value-weighted index of bid-ask 
spreads. A value-weighted portfolio would assign weights to each bid-ask spread based 
upon the market value of the shares outstanding. For example, if the market value of 
Argentine bonds were ten times the value of Danish bonds, Argentina would receive ten 
times the weight of Denmark. 
 There is an advantage to using the equally weighted bid-ask spread rather than the 
value-weighted spread as a measure of market liquidity, however. Doing so ensures the 
index is not skewed toward bonds with large market capitalizations, which tend to be 
immune to market-wide decreases in liquidity. The equally weighted index is a broader 
measure of market liquidity than one that weights larger, more liquid bonds more heavily. 
 To capture the time-series variation in liquidity, I define the unexpected change in 
market liquidity between 1t   and t  as: 
      1t t t tL L E L    
That is, I take the change between the current market liquidity and expected market 
liquidity. To avoid introducing a negative correlation between this unexpected change in 
market liquidity and sovereign returns, I set 
1 2[ ]t t tE L L   to obtain 
(3)     
2t t tL L L    
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There are 482 rather than 481 observations because there were 14 rather than the usual 13 issues of the 




This measure of market liquidity is an ex ante indicator of changes in market liquidity 
because it postulates that expectations are formed prior to period 1t   and does not use 
information that would help to predict excess returns on sovereign bonds in period t , 
which are a function of the price at  1t  . Using innovations to liquidity stems from the 
rationale that only unanticipated changes in pervasive risks are priced states variables and 
are thus the variables of interest in asset-pricing tests (Chen, Roll, and Ross 1986). 
4.4.3. Time-Series Features of Bond Market Liquidity 
Table 2 summarizes the time-series features of market liquidity in the London sovereign 
bond market between 1871 and 1907. The first column shows the properties of the level 
series. The average market liquidity is about 2.4%, and it is statistically different from 
zero. The range between the minimum and maximum values for market-wide bond 
liquidity indicates the bid-ask spread lies between about 1.5 and 4.5%. To put these 
values into perspective, these bid-ask spreads are much wider than the spreads in the 
secondary market for Japanese government bonds during the first half of the 1980s 
(Takagi 1987) or the bid-ask spreads in the market for US Treasury bills during the 
second half of the 1990s (Fleming 2002). In both markets the bid-ask spreads are smaller 
than 0.5% and most were smaller than 0.10%. These differences make sense insofar as 
the Japanese and US government bond markets serve as international benchmarks and are 
among the largest and most liquid in the world. The level series is highly persistent. The 
sum of the autoregressive coefficients for this measure of market liquidity is 0.93, which 
is consistent with the magnitude documented by studies of the equity market in the 
current period (Korajczyk and Sadka 2008). Figure 1 provides visual evidence that this 
measure of market liquidity is persistent. 
 The second column in Table 2 shows the properties of the change in the level of 
the bid-ask spread in percentage points. One cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
mean of the series is zero. The differenced series is not persistent. The differenced series 
appears stationary with a zero mean. 
 Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide visual evidence that the level and the change in 
market-wide sovereign bond liquidity identify periods in which investors‟ perceptions of 




dates associated with selected major defaults during this period. As the figures illustrate, 
bid-ask spreads tend to be wide during periods when sovereign borrowers default on their 
external obligations; these defaults are also associated with sharp increases in the spread. 
For example, the largest spike in the plot during 1875-76 is associated with the Ottoman 
Empire‟s default in October 1875 and Egypt‟s default in April 1876, two of the largest 
borrowers in the sovereign debt market during that period. These defaults involved 
lengthy negotiations: The Ottoman Empire reached a final settlement with its creditors in 
1881 and Egypt in 1880 (Suter 1990). Market-wide bid-ask spreads also widened in 
anticipation of the Argentine default in April 1890, which precipitated the Baring crisis in 
November of that year, and the Brazilian default in June 1898. Although the market-wide 
bid-ask spread did not widen in anticipation of Greece‟s default in December 1893, they 
did widen in the month of the actual default. Overall, this evidence suggests that the 
equally weighted bid-ask spread broadly captures market liquidity conditions. 
4.5. Empirical Methods 
Arbitrage-pricing theory predicts that the expected returns on securities are a linear 
function of their exposure to pervasive risks and that these betas describe the cross-
section of security returns. Asset pricing models have the generic form 
(4)     
0 1 1[ ]i i Ki KEr b b       
where [ ]iE r  is the expected return of security i ; 0  is expected zero-beta or risk-free rate 
of return; k ib  is the beta of security i  with respect to the thk  pervasive risk;  and k  is 
the risk premium associated with the thk  pervasive risk (Ross 1976). 
 To estimate the models of the form in equation (4), I first characterize the 
exposure of sovereign bond returns to unexpected changes in market liquidity over time. 
This exercise establishes that unexpected changes affect sovereign bond returns and the 
magnitude of the effect is a function of the sovereign bond‟s observable characteristics. 
To do so, I run time-series regressions on test portfolios sorted by the ex ante bid-ask 
spread and the size of the bond, as measured by the bond‟s market capitalization. Sorting 




dispersion in the portfolios‟ sensitivities to pervasive risks and econometrically identifies 
this variability across portfolios. 
 Starting in January 1871, I assign the returns of each sovereign bond into one of 
ten portfolios based on the size of the each bond‟s bid-ask spread. I link the returns from 
the constituent bonds in a set of ten value- and equally weighted test portfolios. I repeat 
the procedure each month, thereby generating ten separate time series of returns. I 
estimate the time-series regression 
(5)   ( ) ( )it ft i Bi Bt ft Ci Ct ft Li t itr r r r r r L             
for each of the 1, ,10i   value- or equally weighted portfolios of sovereign bond 
portfolios sorted by the ex ante bid-ask spread. In equation (5), i tr  is the return on 
portfolio i ; f tr  is the proxy for the risk-free rate, the London banker bill rate; i  is the 
portfolio-specific risk premium and reflects the risk associated with holding portfolio i ; 
Btr  is the return of the value-weighted foreign sovereign bond index, which is the market 
portfolio of all the sovereign bonds traded on the London Stock Exchange; and C tr  is the 
return of the British consol; and tL  is the unexpected change in liquidity in the 
sovereign bond market, constructed as in equation (3). 
 I include the value-weighted foreign bond index as a pervasive risk based on 
evidence that the excess returns of a bond market index drive most of the time-series 
variation in sovereign bond risk premia (Ilmanen 1995; and Barr and Priestley 2004); and 
I include the excess returns of the British consol to capture changes in British interest 
rates as a pervasive risk because models of sovereign borrowing postulate the price of 
sovereign debt reflects the return on alternative investments, as proxied by the world 
interest rate (Fernández-Arias 1995). The available evidence supports this hypothesis: 
Much of the variation in the developing-country spreads can be accounted for by changes 
in US interest rates (Uribe and Yue 2006). 
 Including the unexpected change in market liquidity as an additional factor in (5) 
enables me to decompose the sovereign bond risk premia into the components 
attributable to business-cycle risk, as measured by the excess returns of the foreign bond 




and the risk associated with unexpected changes in liquidity. In particular, it identifies the 
component of the risk premium associated with such unanticipated changes in liquidity 
and the variation in the liquidity beta Li  across the bid-ask spread-sorted test portfolios. 
Economic theory predicts the liquidity betas will be negative – an increase in the market-
wide bid-ask spread is a decrease in market liquidity, which depresses contemporaneous 
security prices and reduces security returns (Acharya and Pedersen 2005). As I discuss 
below, the evidence from these regressions supports this hypothesis. 
 In light of this evidence that innovations in liquidity explain the time-series 
variation in bond risk premia, I form a liquidity-mimicking portfolio 
tIML  that reflects 
the time-series behavior of pervasive liquidity risk to assess if this liquidity factor is a 
priced state variable. This liquidity-mimicking portfolio is the difference in returns 
between the least liquid and the most liquid portfolio from the ten test portfolios sorted 
by the bid-ask spread 
(6)     
t It LtIML r r   
where Itr  denotes the returns of the most illiquid sovereign bond portfolio; and Ltr  
denotes the returns of the most liquid sovereign bond portfolio. This liquidity-mimicking 
portfolio is identical to postulating that an investor holds a leveraged portfolio that 
invests £1 in the least liquid sovereign bond portfolio and sells £1 of the most liquid 
sovereign bond portfolio. 
 I use the liquidity-mimicking portfolio 
tIML  rather than tL  to test if market 
liquidity is a priced state variable. The rationale for constructing such a liquidity-
mimicking portfolio is that the returns associated with this portfolio mimic the returns 
associated with hedging liquidity risk and allows me to compute the risk premium ˆL  
associated with liquidity risk. Such a procedure captures the returns associated with a 
hedging portfolio that is exposed to particular pervasive risks (see, for example, Chen, 
Roll, and Ross 1986; Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger 1989; and Fama and French 
1996). 
 I postulate a three-factor model for sovereign bond returns based on the excess 




differential on the most illiquid and the most liquid portfolios. I estimate the risk premia 
ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  B C L    implied by (4) using efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
Appendix 2 discusses this procedure in more detail. Using GMM to estimate the risk 
premia enables me to test formally the fit of the set of models and the ability of the 
liquidity premium to explain cross-sectional differences in sovereign bond risk premia 
using the D -test (Newey and West 1987b). The evidence provided by the results of these 
tests suggests that liquidity risk is a priced state variable that is important for pricing 
sovereign debt. 
4.6. Empirical Evidence 
4.6.1. Spread-Sorted Test Portfolios 
Table 3 and Table 4 contain average excess returns and regression results for the ten 
value-weighted portfolios sorted by the bid-ask spread. Table 3 does not include the 
unexpected change in market liquidity as an independent variable whereas Table 4 does 
include it. The results in the first row of Table 4 show that, unconditionally, the portfolio 
with the least liquid sovereign bonds earns, on average, an annualized excess return of 
5.10% whereas the portfolio with the most liquid securities earns, on average, an 
annualized excess return of 2.48%. Less liquid sovereign bonds thus command a higher 
return. Controlling for differences in business-cycle risk and interest-rate risk, the returns 
from the portfolio of illiquid sovereign bonds are larger than the returns from the 
portfolio of liquid bonds. The last column in Table 3 shows that a strategy of investing £1 
in the least liquid sovereign bond portfolio and selling £1 of the most liquid sovereign 
bond portfolio would have generated an average annual excess return of 4%. This 
evidence suggests that the risk premium is larger for illiquid securities. The most liquid 
bonds are more sensitive to business-cycle risk, as captured by the excess returns of the 
foreign bond index, than the least liquid bonds. At almost 50 basis points per month, this 
difference is substantial and statistically significant, suggesting that illiquid sovereign 
bonds are more sensitive to business-cycle risk than liquid sovereign bonds. The least 
liquid bonds are more exposed to the risk associated with changes in British interest rates, 




there are systematic differences between liquid and illiquid sovereign bonds and that they 
are attributable to their differential exposure to the excess returns of the foreign bond 
index. As Table 4 reports, an unexpected decrease in liquidity reduces contemporaneous 
returns, which is consistent with economic theory. When the bid-ask spread unexpectedly 
widens and market liquidity declines, sovereign bond prices fall and generate negative 
returns. The least liquid sovereign bonds are more sensitive to decreases in market-wide 
bond liquidity than the most liquid bonds: On average, a one percentage point increase in 
the market-wide bid-ask spread reduces the returns on the least liquid bonds by 1.68% in 
a given month whereas a similar change in market-wide bond liquidity reduces the 
returns on the most liquid bonds by 0.73% in a given month. Both betas are statistically 
different from zero. The last column shows, however, that the difference between the two 
betas is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 Table 5 and Table 6 show the results for equally weighted sovereign bond 
portfolios as test portfolios. They are similar to those reported in Table 3 and Table 4, but 
at about 3.1% per year the premium for holding illiquid sovereign bonds is somewhat 
smaller than that implied by the value-weighted portfolios. Again, the most liquid 
sovereign bonds are more exposed to the risk associated with changes in the business-
cycle risk, as proxied by the excess returns of the foreign bond index, and this difference 
is statistically significant. The difference between the exposure to changes in British 
interest rates of the least liquid and the most liquid portfolios is smaller in magnitude than 
reported in Table 3 and Table 4, and it remains statistically insignificant. 
 Table 6 indicates that including the unexpected change in market liquidity as a 
nontraded factor does not materially alter the results compared to those reported in Table 
4, but the sensitivity of the least liquid portfolio to innovations in market liquidity is 
statistically different from the sensitivity of the most liquid portfolio to innovations in 
market liquidity. A one percentage point increase in the market-wide bid-ask spread 
reduces the returns on the most liquid sovereign bond portfolio by 1.72% more than such 
a change reduces the return on the most liquid sovereign bond portfolio. This finding is 
intuitive: Less liquid sovereign bonds are harder to trade during a credit crunch and, 





 The excess returns of the illiquid portfolio do not reflect the differential exposure 
of these bonds to the excess returns of the foreign bond index. That the least liquid bonds 
are less sensitive to business-cycle risk than the most liquid bonds suggests that the larger 
excess returns these bonds earn is not compensation for bearing more aggregate risk. 
Instead these excess returns reflect compensation for bearing the risk associated with the 
least liquid portfolio‟s sensitivity to market liquidity and changes in British interest rates. 
4.6.2. Size-Sorted Test Portfolios 
Table 7 and Table 8 report the regression results where the test portfolios are value-
weighted portfolios sorted by size. Table 7 shows that the small sovereign bond portfolio 
earns a 3.47% premium relative to the large sovereign bond portfolio, after adjusting for 
business-cycle risk and interest-rate risk. Large sovereign bonds tend to be more exposed 
than small sovereign bonds to the risk associated with the excess returns on the foreign 
bond portfolio but less exposed to risk associated with changes in British interest rates. 
Both differences are statistically significant, but the difference in the betas associated 
with the excess returns of the foreign bond index is larger in magnitude. On average, a 
1% increase in the excess return of the foreign bond portfolio reduces the returns of the 
leveraged portfolio by 1.2% per month. By way of contrast, on average a 1% increase in 
the returns on the British consol index increases the returns of the leveraged portfolio by 
0.23% in a given month. 
 Table 8 repeats the regressions from Table 7 but adds the portfolio 
tIML  as a 
traded factor. In every case except one, the estimated beta on the liquidity-mimicking 
portfolio is statistically different from zero. The largest and smallest sovereign bond 
portfolios carry different sensitivities to the liquidity-mimicking portfolio. The portfolio 
of the smallest sovereign bonds carries a loading that is 15 basis points larger than the 
loading associated with the portfolio of the largest sovereign bonds, suggesting that 
smaller sovereign bonds are more exposed to liquidity risk. Smaller sovereign bonds are 
also less sensitive to excess returns of the foreign bond index and more sensitive to 
changes in British interest rates. These finding makes sense insofar as smaller sovereign 
bond issues are less liquid than larger sovereign bond issues and are consistent with the 




 Table 9 and Table 10 repeat the regressions in Table 7 and Table 8 but use equally 
weighted portfolios of sovereign bond returns sorted by size. The results are very similar. 
Again, the portfolio of the smallest sovereign bonds is more sensitive to unexpected 
changes in market liquidity in the sovereign bond market, as captured by the liquidity-
mimicking portfolio, although the difference between the sensitivities of the smallest and 
the largest sovereign bond portfolios to the liquidity-mimicking portfolio is not 
statistically different from zero. This finding indicates that the betas in this specification 
exhibit less dispersion than the betas in the specification with value-weighted portfolios 
and suggests that there is larger estimation error associated with the smaller sovereign 
bond issues, which receive the same weight as the larger bond issues, and whose returns 
tend to be more volatile. 
 Taken together, these results suggest that the difference in returns between the 
least liquid portfolio and the most liquid portfolio can explain the differences in the 
variation of sovereign bond risk premia that are sorted by size. Smaller sovereign bonds 
are more exposed to liquidity risk than larger sovereign bonds, and this difference is both 
economically and statistically significant. 
4.6.3. Sovereign Bond Risk Premia and the Liquidity Premium 
Table 11 reports the efficient GMM estimates of the risk premia. The first column in the 
table (Unrestricted) reports the estimates for the risk premia from the model with all three 
risk factors. All of the estimated risk premia are statistically different zero. A portfolio 
that had a beta of one with respect to the excess returns of the foreign bond portfolio and 
betas of zero with respect to the other two pervasive risks would have earned about 3.8% 
per year; a portfolio that had a beta of one with respect to the excess returns of the British 
consol and betas of zero with respect to the other two pervasive risks would have earned 
about 4.1% per year; and a portfolio that had a beta of one with respect to the excess 
returns of the liquidity-mimicking portfolio 
tIML  and betas of zero with respect to the 
other two pervasive risks would have earned about 22.6% per year. The component of a 
portfolio 'si  expected return that is attributable to liquidity risk is given by the product of 
the liquidity beta with the risk premium 
Li L  . The contribution of liquidity risk to the 




value into perspective, the contribution of business-cycle risk is -4.48% per year 
( 1.14 0.0375)   and that for interest-rate risk is 0.79% per year (0.19 0.0413) . The 
negative contribution of business-cycle risk arises because the S M L  portfolio has a 
negative exposure to business-cycle risk: The beta with respect to the foreign bond index 
on the small bond portfolio is smaller in size than the beta with respect to the foreign 
bond index associated with the large bond portfolio. The contribution of liquidity risk to 
expected returns is thus comparable in magnitude to the contribution of business-cycle 
risk and larger than the contribution of interest-rate risk. 
 The second column (Restricted 1) shows the estimated risk premia for the model 
excluding the excess returns of the foreign bond portfolio. Both of the risk premia are 
economically and statistically significant. The estimated risk premium for the British 
consol is about 9.8% per year; and the estimated risk premium for the liquidity-
mimicking factor is about 14.2% per year. Although smaller in magnitude than the 
estimated liquidity premium in the unrestricted specification, the liquidity premium in 
this specification remains sizable. Again, this evidence indicates the importance of the 
liquidity premium in explaining sovereign bond risk premia. The results of the D -test 
suggest that one can reject the null hypothesis that the excess return of the British consol 
and the liquidity-mimicking factor by themselves provide a statistically adequate 
characterization of the sovereign bond risk premia. 
 The third column (Restricted 2) shows the estimated risk premia for the 
specification that excludes the excess returns of the British consol. The estimated risk 
premium for the foreign bond index is about 3.9% per year and that for the liquidity 
premium is about 22.5% per year. The D -test rejects the null hypothesis that including 
the excess returns of the British consol in the unrestricted model does not statistically 
improve the performance of this model. 
 The fourth column (Restricted 3) reports the estimates from the specification 
excluding the liquidity-mimicking factor. The estimated risk premia for the foreign bond 
index and the British consol are both statistically significant. Importantly, the D -test 
rejects this specification in favor of the unrestricted model that includes the excess 




include liquidity-mimicking factor in the model to provide an adequate statistical 
characterization of sovereign bond risk premia. 
 All of the evidence points in the same direction. The liquidity premium is 
statistically significant and, based on the estimates from the unrestricted model, the 
contribution of liquidity risk to the expected returns of the S M L  portfolio is 
economically meaningful. In each of these specifications, the liquidity premium is 
statistically significant. Moreover, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that all three of 
the pervasive risk factors are needed to characterize adequately the data. This finding is 
important because it shows that innovations in liquidity are a priced state variable, above 
and beyond business-cycle risk, as captured by the excess returns of the foreign bond 
index, and interest rate risk, as captured by the excess returns of the British consol. 
Lenders in the London sovereign debt market valued liquidity and demanded a premium 
for bearing the risk associated with holding sovereign debt exposed to such risk. 
4.7. Conclusion 
Events such as the flight to liquidity during the 1998 Russian financial crisis suggest a 
strong role for the liquidity risk on the price of sovereign debt traded internationally, 
particularly during periods of financial upheaval. Notwithstanding the importance of 
uncovering the quantitative importance of liquidity risk in the price of sovereign debt, 
contemporary data are ill-suited to addressing studying the relationship between 
sovereign bond risk premia and liquidity risk. In contrast, the data used in this paper from 
the London Stock Exchange can shed light on this relationship. The late 19
th
 century was 
the last time that a large and diverse sample of sovereign bonds with observable bid-ask 
spreads was traded on a single, centralized market, denominated in a single currency, and 
for a period sufficiently long to conduct asset-pricing tests. 
 Empirical analysis of these data establish that sovereign bonds with wide bid-ask 
spreads earn about 3-4% more per year than sovereign bonds with narrow bid-ask 
spreads. This premium for holding less liquid sovereign bonds reflects the greater 
sensitivity of such bonds to variations in unexpected changes in liquidity than more liquid 
sovereign bonds. Moreover, the data show that the excess returns associated with a 




variable important for pricing sovereign bond risk premia. That is, cross-sectional 
differences in sovereign bond risk premia are linearly related to the sensitivities of returns 
to fluctuations in market liquidity, as captured by this liquidity-mimicking portfolio. The 
liquidity premium‟s contribution to the risk premium associated with sovereign debt is 
economically large and statistically significant. It is comparable in absolute magnitude to 
the contribution of business-cycle risk to expected returns and larger than the contribution 
of interest-rate risk. The significance of liquidity risk is robust to controlling for business-
cycle risk and interest rate risk, suggesting an independent role for liquidity risk, above 
and beyond these other two pervasive risks. Overall, this evidence suggests a strong role 
for liquidity risk as a driver of sovereign bond risk premia. 
 From a policy perspective, the quantitative importance of the liquidity premium‟s 
contribution to expected returns suggests that sovereign borrowers can reduce their 
borrowing costs by floating more liquid issues. As this paper shows, larger issues tend to 
be less exposed to liquidity risk, so one way of improving the liquidity of a bond issue to 
increase its size. Thus, to the extent that sovereign borrowers can roll smaller bond issues 
into a single large issue, doing so would reduce the issue‟s exposure to liquidity risk and 
hence sovereign borrowing costs. Although this recommendation is consistent with 
economic intuition, the evidence in this paper indicates that the liquidity premium can 
add substantially to borrowing costs and identifies it as a key determinant of the 







Table 4-1. Developing Country Bond Issues, Equity Issues, and Loan Commitments, 1990-2007 (cont.) 
(USD billions) 
            
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
            
Bonds 7.8 13.9 24.4 62.7 56.5 59.2 103.0 126.2 79.5 82.4 80.5 
            
Equities 1.2 5.6 7.2 11.9 18.0 10.0 17.8 26.2 9.4 23.2 41.8 
            
Loans 28.4 50.7 42.5 43.0 55.2 82.0 89.0 122.5 60.0 58.1 94.2 







Table 4-1. Developing Country Bond Issues, Equity Issues, and Loan Commitments, 1990-2007 (concl.) 
(USD billions) 
        
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        
Bonds 89.4 65.0 100.5 135.6 186.6 179.9 207.9 
        
Equities 11.2 16.5 27.7 45.8 85.5 121.4 170.7 
        
Loans 64.2 82.5 97.6 148.3 189.7 252.1 282.9 
Source: International Monetary Fund.
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Table 4-2. Time-Series Features of Bond Market Liquidity 














Mean Abs. Dev. 2.38  0.14 
Min. 1.48  -1.16 
Max. 4.46  1.56 
Persistence 0.93  0.15 
Notes: The sample is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). The p-values 
of the test for a zero mean are based on heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors (Newey and West 1987a). The 
measure of persistence is the sum of the autoregressive coefficients 
(Andrews and Chen 1994). The autoregressive lag order is determined 







Table 4-3. Value-Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios Sorted by Spread 
Dependent Variable: i t f tr r  
            
 Liquid 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Illiquid IML  
            
Annualized i fr r  2.48 3.13 2.88 2.50 2.60 1.90 2.49 4.58 3.50 5.10 2.62 







































































            
2R  0.34 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.09 
Notes: The estimation period is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). IMLdenotes the leveraged portfolio that is long £1 of the 
most illiquid portfolio and short £1 of the most liquid portfolio. All of the returns are taken in excess of the risk-free rate f tr , the 
London banker bill rate. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors 







Table 4-4. Value-Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios Sorted by Spread 
Dependent Variable: i t f tr r  
            
 Liquid 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Illiquid IML  
            
Annualized i fr r  2.48 3.13 2.88 2.50 2.60 1.90 2.49 4.58 3.50 5.10 2.62 































































































            
2R  0.34 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.10 
Notes: The estimation period is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). IML denotes the leveraged portfolio that is long £1 of the most 
illiquid portfolio and short £1 of the most liquid portfolio. All of the returns are taken in excess of the risk-free rate f tr , the London 
banker bill rate. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (Newey and 







Table 4-5. Equally Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios Sorted by Spread 
Dependent Variable: i t f tr r  
            
 Liquid 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Illiquid IML  
            
Annualized i fr r  2.31 2.78 2.76 2.01 2.38 1.83 2.18 3.42 2.99 4.50 2.19 







































































            
2R  0.24 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.06 
Notes: The estimation period is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). IML denotes the leveraged portfolio that is long £1 of the 
most illiquid portfolio and short £1 of the most liquid portfolio. All of the returns are taken in excess of the risk-free rate f tr , the 
London banker bill rate. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors 







Table 4-6. Equally Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios Sorted by Spread 
Dependent Variable: i t f tr r  
            
 Liquid 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Illiquid IML  
            
Annualized i fr r  2.31 2.78 2.76 2.01 2.38 1.83 2.18 3.42 2.99 4.50 2.19 































































































            
2R  0.24 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.08 
Notes: The estimation period is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). IML denotes the leveraged portfolio that is long £1 of the 
most illiquid portfolio and short £1 of the most liquid portfolio. All of the returns are taken in excess of the risk-free rate f tr , the 
London banker bill rate. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors 







Table 4-7. Value-Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios Sorted by Size 
Dependent Variable: i t f tr r  
            
 Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Large S M L  
            
Annualized i fr r  4.05 2.98 3.84 3.94 4.58 3.26 3.97 2.52 3.44 4.16 -0.11 







































































            
2R  0.02 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.96 0.74 
Notes: The estimation period is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). SMLdenotes the leveraged portfolio that is long £1 of the 
smallest portfolio and short £1 of the largest portfolio. All of the returns are taken in excess of the risk-free rate f tr , the London 
banker bill rate. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (Newey 







Table 4-8. Value-Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios Sorted by Size 
Dependent Variable: i t f tr r  
            
 Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Large S M L  
            
Annualized i fr r  4.05 2.98 3.84 3.94 4.58 3.26 3.97 2.52 3.44 4.16 -0.11 































































































            
2R  0.11 0.19 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.96 0.76 
Notes: The estimation period is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). SML  denotes the leveraged portfolio that is long £1 of the 
smallest portfolio and short £1 of the largest portfolio. All of the returns are taken in excess of the risk-free rate f tr , the London 
banker bill rate. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (Newey 







Table 4-9. Equally Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios Sorted by Size 
Dependent Variable: i t f tr r  
            
 Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Large S M L  
            
Annualized i fr r  3.72 2.41 3.00 3.29 3.60 2.39 3.10 2.11 3.07 3.04 0.68 







































































            
2R  0.03 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.67 0.42 
Notes: The estimation period is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). SML  denotes the leveraged portfolio that is long £1 of the 
smallest portfolio and short £1 of the largest portfolio. All of the returns are taken in excess of the risk-free rate f tr , the London 
banker bill rate. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (Newey 







Table 4-10. Equally Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios Sorted by Size 
Dependent Variable: i t f tr r  
            
 Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Large S M L  
            
Annualized i fr r  3.72 2.41 3.00 3.29 3.60 2.39 3.10 2.11 3.07 3.04 0.68 































































































            
2R  0.11 0.22 0.23 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.21 0.25 0.67 0.43 
Notes: The estimation period is 1871.1-1907.12 (482 observations). SML  denotes the leveraged portfolio that is long £1 of the 
smallest portfolio and short £1 of the largest portfolio. All of the returns are taken in excess of the risk-free rate f tr , the London 
banker bill rate. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (Newey 







Table 4-11. Risk Premia for Value-Weighted Sovereign Bond Portfolios 
Dependent Variable: i fr r  
 
     
 Unrestricted Restricted 1 Restricted 2 Restricted 3 
     














































Reject 0H ?  Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The estimated risk premia are annualized. ˆL  refers to the estimated risk premium associated with the liquidity-
mimicking portfolio tI M L . TJ -test refers to the Hansen (1982) test of the overidentifying restrictions. The null 
hypothesis is that the moment conditions are all satisfied. D -test refers to the Newey-West (1987b) model 
specification test. The null hypothesis is that including the additional variables in the unrestricted model does not 
improve the performance of the restricted model. The estimates in the restricted model are based on optimal weighting 
matrix from the unrestricted model. The p-values in parentheses are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 








Figure 4-1. Market Liquidity in the London Sovereign Bond Market, 1871.1-1907.12 
Notes: The change in the market-wide bid-ask spread is defined in equation (3) of the text.











































Figure 4-2. Market Liquidity and Major Defaults, 1871.1-1907.12 






























Figure 4-3. Changes in Market Liquidity and Major Defaults, 1871.1-1907.12 































Sovereign Bond Price Data 
For each of the sovereign bonds, I use the price and coupon data to compute the time 
series of realized holding-period returns corrected for sovereign defaults. To date these 
defaults, I rely on the dates provided by Suter (1990), but I also consulted the annual 
reports issued by the Council of Foreign Bondholders. Although the sovereign bonds that 
were in default were not actively traded, it was common the underwriting firms to keep 
these prices on the books. The prices of these sovereign bonds were quoted in the Money 
Market Review and the Economist, even though they ceased paying coupons and were not 
actively traded on the exchange. Depending on how negotiations between the debtor 
country and its creditors proceeded, these bonds could remain on the underwriters‟ books 
for years. These sovereign bonds pose a challenge because they tend to have very wide 
bid-ask spreads and very low returns, biasing the returns of the most illiquid portfolio 
downwards and the returns of the most liquid portfolio upwards. To address this problem, 
I removed all of the sovereign bonds trading below £40 or 40% of par. 
Sovereign Bond Data 
The countries included in the sovereign-bond dataset are Argentina; Australia; Austria-
Hungary; Belgium; Brazil; British Guiana; Bulgaria; Canada; Ceylon; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Denmark; Ecuador; Egypt; France; Germany; Greece; Guatemala; 
Hawaii; Honduras; Hong Kong; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Liberia; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Norway; Orange Free State; Paraguay; Peru; 
Portugal; Russia; Saint Lucia; Santo Domingo; South Africa; Spain; Straits Settlements; 
Sweden; Trinidad; Turkey; United States; Uruguay; and Venezuela. 
The British colonies comprise a subset of the countries in this sample. They are 
Australia; British Guiana; Canada; Ceylon; Hong Kong; Jamaica; Mauritius; New 





Generalized Method of Moments 
In the Generalized Method of Moments procedure, the model error vector is given by 
(A2.1)     ( ) [ ] [( ) ]t ft t ft tgb Er r E r r f b     
where 1 10[ ] , ,t ft t ft t ftE r r E r r r r
       is the vector of excess returns of each of the 
ten test portfolios; [ , , ]t Bt ft Ct ft It Ltf r r r r r r      is the vector excess returns of each the 
three factors; and [ ,  ,  ]  
B C Lb b b b  of factor sensitivities. The sample analogue is 
(A2.2)     
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In the first step, 1b  is the solution to minimization problem 
(A2.3)     
1 1 1arg min ( ) ( )T T Tb g bWg b  
where T TW I . If we define the sample gradient as 





T t f t
t
D T r r f

  , 
the analytical solution to (A2.3) is 
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In the second step, 2b  is the solution to the minimization problem 
(A2.6)     *
2 2 2arg min ( ) ( )T T Tb g b Wg b  
where the optimal weighting matrix 
*
TW  is a consistent estimator of the long-run 
variance-covariance matrix of the moments from the first-stage 
1 1
1
ˆ[ var( ( ))]
T T
T g b S  , 
such as the one proposed by Newey and West (1987a). The analytical solution to (A2.6) 
is 
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The three papers that comprise my dissertation study international asset markets. The first 
paper establishes that crude oil future contracts are poor predictors of the future spot price 
of oil but that the spread between the current futures price and the current spot price can 
be viewed as an indicator of changes in the precautionary demand for crude oil. The 
second paper shows that the exchange rate regime matters less for both the sovereign and 
the private cost of capital than previously thought. The third paper finds that liquidity risk 
is a quantitatively important determinant of sovereign borrowing costs in the market for 
international debt. 
 By extending our knowledge of how particular international asset markets 
function, these papers contribute to the ongoing discussion about the implications of 
international financial integration. As long as international financial integration remains 
an important feature of the current economic landscape, such an understanding will 
remain critical not only for those who wish to make sense of this environment but also for 
those who wish to influence the direction that it will take. 
